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I. INTRODUCTION
C ancer, a disease characterized by the progressive and unrestrained
growth of populations of abnormal cells,' is probably the most feared
disease process in the United States today.2 The reasons for this are nu-
merous. First, and most obvious, is that except for the non-melanoma
skin strain, cancer is frequently fatal,' and when it is not, it requires ag-
' OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, IDENTIFICATION, CLASSIFICATION,
AND REGULATION OF POTENTIAL OCCUPATIONAL CARCINOGENS, 45 Fed. Reg. 5,016-17 (1980) (to
be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1990 (1980)) [hereinafter cited as OSHA CARCINOGEN POLICY],
points out that cancer is actually a large group of different disease processes which share
certain common features. These features include (1) uncontrollable growth of cells; and (2)
killing the host cell by either a local extension into the tissue from which it arose (invasion)
or by spreading to distant sites (metastasis). J. WYNGAARDEN & L. SMITH, CECIL TEXTBOOK
OF MEDICINE 1010 (16th ed. 1982).
2 Once cancer is understood, another disease will inevitably replace it as the most
feared. One author notes that in early biblical times, leprosy was such a disease. In late
medieval times, that distinction focused on the bubonic plague or the "black death." In the
19th, tuberculosis, the "white death," was most commonly associated with human suffering.
H. PITOT, FUNDAMENTALS OF ONCOLOGY 1 (1978).
1 In 1980, the American Cancer Society (ACS) estimated that 815,000 new cases of can-
cer (excepting non-melanoma skin cancer) would be diagnosed in 1981. The ACS also esti-
mated 420,000 (more than 1,000 per day) people would die from cancer in 1981. Although
the cancers diagnosed in a given year are not necessarily reflected by the deaths that year
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CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
gressive and expensive therapy that is generally most unpleasant. 4 Sec-
ond, over the last several decades, cancer has become an increasingly
common cause of death and disease. Cancer is the second leading cause of
death in the United States today.* Third, despite the expenditure of bil-
lions of dollars on research,' the causes of cancer in humans are really
not known, nor are the mechanisms by which cancer develops.
There are a number of factors which contribute to the frequency with
which cancer is observed today. One reason that cancer is so common is
that other causes of death are relatively less prevalent. In 1900, cancer
was the eighth leading cause of death, accounting for only four percent of
deaths, with infectious diseases such as influenza, pneumonia, tuberculo-
sis, and infectious gastrointestinal disease far outranking it. s With the
introduction of antibiotics and improvements in sanitation and nutrition,
death from infectious disease became relatively less common, and death
from cancer became relatively more so. Additionally, with the reduction
of other types of disease, people live longer, thereby allowing more to
reach the age at which cancer traditionally has been a greater risk.10 Fi-
nally, with the advent of improved diagnostic techniques, cancer is recog-
nized more frequently than it was in the past.1
from cancer, the proportion of deaths from given types of cancer is instructive. For example,
there were estimated to be 122,000 new cases of lung cancer in 1981. There were estimated
to be 105,000 lung cancer deaths. AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY, CANCER FACTS AND FIGURES
(1980).
Direct costs for all cancers (doctor and hospital care) amounted to 7% of the costs
incurred for all illnesses. Indirect costs (based on a lost earnings approach) amounted to
19% of total indirect costs. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ASSESSMENT OF TECHNOLO-
GIES FOR DETERMINING CANCER RISKS FROM THE ENVIRONMENT 33 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
OTA REPORT]. The cost for medical care for cancer patients in 1977 was $5.5 billion. The
expected future earnings of those who died that year was $14.6 to $18.5 billion. OSHA CAR-
CINOGEN POLICY, supra note 1, at 5,016.
' PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, HEALTHY PEOPLE: THE SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT ON
HEALTH PROMOTION AND DISEASE PREVENTION 60 (1979) [hereinafter cited as HEALTHY PEO-
PLE]. Cancer accounts for about 20% of total U.S. mortality, second only to heart disease
which accounts for 38% of deaths. OTA REPORT, supra note 4, at 31.
" In the 1974 fiscal year alone, the National Cancer Institute reported expenditures of
$100 million for research on the environmental causes of cancer. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OF-
FICE, FEDERAL EFFORTS TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC FROM CANCER CAUSING CHEMICALS ARE NOT
VERY EFFECTIVE (1976).
' The OSHA Carcinogen Policy states: "The early cellular and molecular events of the
disease and the mechanisms leading to its initiation are not fully understood." OSHA CAR-
CINOGEN POLICY, supra note 1, at 5,016.
8 HEALTHY PEOPLE, supra note 5, at 4. If the mortality rates today were the same as
they were in 1900, 400,000 people a year would die from tuberculosis, almost 300,000 from
gastroenteritis, 80,000 from diphtheria and 55,000 from polio. Id. at 3. See also OSHA CAR-
CINOGEN POLICY, supra note 1, at 5,033.
* OTA REPORT, supra note 4, at 32.
OSHA CARCINOGEN POLICY, supra note 1, at 5,026.
OTA REPORT, supra note 4, at 32.
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The legal system's difficulty in dealing with cancers is largely caused by
the medical community's lack of understanding of what causes cancers
and how they develop. While a number of theories of cancer causation
exist, there is no certainty as to which theory is correct. Epidemiologists
observe working and environmental conditions and attempt to determine
any association between increased incidences of cancer and work and en-
vironmental factors. There are almost always imperfections, however, in
the epidemiological studies, since multiple factors may be involved, and
increased incidences may be coincidental. Because of these uncertainties,
courts have had difficulty in accepting epidemiological evidence. Most
medical opinions, however, are based on probability, not certainty.
Medicine is, after all, sometimes more an art than a science. Thus, if epi-
demiological studies are carefully performed and show material and sub-
stantial evidence of causation, such evidence should be accepted by the
courts subject, of course, to rebuttal evidence.
II. THEORIES OF CANCER CAUSATION
Though cancer was known in antiquity, and the term carcinoma was
coined by Hippocrates in the fourth century b.c.,'2 it was not until the
nineteenth century that cancer began to be studied systematically and
intensively."3 During the nineteenth century, there were three general
lines of investigation. One centered on the theory that cancer was the
result of a chronic physical irritation of cells. Cancers which developed in
and around scars or ulcerations and those which occurred after acute or
chronic injury were cited in support of this hypothesis. Essentially, this
theory assumed that normal cells are converted to cancer cells.14  The
second theory, which also assumed that normal cells could become can-
cerous, stated that some infectious agent causes cancer. While some type
of bacterial agent was sought in the nineteenth century, twentieth cen-
tury research has focused on viruses as etiologic agents. 15 Interestingly,
viral causes of cancer have been isolated in animals, but no such agent
has been isolated as yet in humans. 6
12 PITOT, supra note 2 at 3. See also WYNGAARDEN AND SMITH, supra note 1, at 1010
(discussing the historical roots about the causes of cancer).
's PITOT, supra note 2, at 4.
I d. at 6. This theory of carcinogenesis is no longer supported by most oncologists.
However, chronic irritation may nevertheless produce cells that are a more fertile ground in
which carcinogens may act. Id. at 42-43.
" In the early years of the twentieth century, Johannes Fibiger performed experiments
wich evidenced a link between a parasite and the growth of stomach tumors. In 1926, for
that work, he was awarded the Nobel Prize in Medicine. One year later, his experiments
were shown to be invalid. This resulted in a setback for the infectious agent theory of cancer
causation. See M. SHIMKIN, CONTRARY TO NATURE 245-46 (1977).
1" WYNGAARDEN & SMITH, supra note 1, at 1011. See also PITOT, supra note 2, at 46-47
(discussing viral theories of cancer development).
1984-851
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The third theory prominent in the nineteenth century stated that can-
cer cells exist in the body from the time of embryonic development and
express themselves later in life.' 7  Presumably, part of the rationale be-
hind this theory is that many cancer cells resemble embryonic tissue, i.e.
they are undifferentiated in their appearance.' 8
In the twentieth century, experiments on animals indicated that certain
substances were capable of producing cancer by themselves, but that
other substances, while not able to produce cancer, were capable of en-
hancing its development in animals treated with either mild carcinogens,
or carcinogens at a dose incapable of producing cancer alone. These ex-
periments and other research lend support to a theory that cancer might
be more than a one-step process; some substances may act as initiators
while others act as promotors. A single substance may be its own initiator
and promotor, or a substance may independently only initiate the pro-
cess, but not cause cancer unless another substance, the promotor, is
present. s
Since cancer is the unrestrained growth of individual cells, techniques
recently developed to examine individual cells and their components,
such as electron microscopy, are being utilized to determine how cancer is
caused. Most scientists have directed their attention to the nucleus of the
cell because it is there that the critical processes, including cell replica-
tion, are controlled. 0 All cells function by means of a vast number of
chemical and physical processes. These govern the cells' own metabolism,
its differentiation into a certain type of cell, (such as a nerve cell or liver
cell), whether and to what extent it proliferates, and whether it produces
products used outside the cell, such as antibodies. Each cell must contain
and transmit to daughter cells the instructions for these processes. These
instructions are contained in molecules of deoxyribose nucleic acid
(DNA), which is found almost exclusively in the cell nucleus.
x" PITOT, supra note 2, at 6.
Is Id.
Is WYNGAARDEN & SMITH, supra note 1, at 1011. See also OSHA CARCINOGEN POLICY,
supra note 1, at 5017-20 (discussing the cumulative contribution of carcinogens). One of
those submitting a statement to OSHA said:
"Initiation" describes s specific and irreversible cellular alteration induced by car-
cinogenic substances and resulting in a population of latent or dormant tumor
cells. "Promotion" describes the proliferation of those cells, a process which is
induced by subsequent exposure to the same or a different substance and which
results in progression to clinical cancer. Classical initiation-promotion studies il-
lustrate well the synergistic effects of separate exposures which would not have
independently produced cancer at the doses involved. It is significant to note that
the conditions induced by initiator substances persist; therefore, exposure to a
promoting substance even after considerable delay can result in cancer.
OSHA CARCINOGEN POLICY, supra note 1, at 5018 (testimony of Dr. Robert Squire).
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The basic unit of DNA structure is known as a nucleotide, and it may
be that in this structure lies the secret of cancer causation. The nucleo-
tide is comprised of a five-carbon sugar (deoxyribose), with a phosphate
group attached to it. This structure is linked to one of four specific mole-
cules, called bases. The four bases are adenine and guanine (known as
purines), and thymine and cytosine (known as pyrimidines). Thus, there
are four possible nucleotides. These four types of nucleotides are linked
together by the phosphate groups which extend from one sugar to the
next. This results in long polynucleotide chains. A complete DNA mole-
cule is formed by two polynucleotide chains which are tightly wound
about each other with complementary bases pairing with each other, thus
forming a double helix. Schematically, the double helix resembles a spiral
staircase, with the base pairs forming the steps.
The replication of DNA may occur in two ways. It may "unzip" com-
pletely and replicate itself in its entirety during the process of cell divi-
sion, so that each daughter cell gets a complete copy of all the informa-
tion in the parent cell. DNA may also partially "unzip," and transcribe
certain information to single stranded molecules of ribonucleic acid
(RNA). These RNA molecules then convey that information out of the
nucleus and into the cell body, where proteins are manufactured. Each
set of three bases (a triplet) codes for a single amino acid, many
thousands of which are required to construct a single protein.2 Certain
base triplets also are thought to provide "start" and "stop" signals for the
production of certain products or processes, including cell replication.2
The strands of DNA are collected in chromosomes. Chromosomes func-
tionally are divided into genes, which were originally defined as the he-
reditary determinant of a single characteristic, but which are now more
often defined as segments of DNA which code for a single protein.23  At-
tention has focused in recent years on the genes which form the chromo-
somes.24 A recent theory postulates that certain genes can be modified,
perhaps by as little as the mutation of a single nucleotide, which results
in the change of a single amino acid.2 This change produces an
oncogene, a gene which may cause the cell to activate and proliferate
21 See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PROBLEMS IN ASsESSING THE CANCER RISKS OF Low-
LEVEL IONIZING RADIATION ExposuRE, 2-20, 8-3 through 8-6 (1981). See generally J. THOMP-
SON & M. THOMPSON, GENETICS IN MEDICINE 32-52 (1980) (discussing the function and struc-
ture of chromosones); WYNG AARDEN & SMITH, supra note 1, at 7-11 (presenting an overview
of biochemical genetics); J. Darnell, The Processing of RNA, 249 Sci. AM. 90-100 (Oct. 1983)
(describing the transcription of DNA into RNA and the translation of RNA into proteins).
" WYNGAARDEN & SMITH, supra note 1, at 10-11.
I' Id. at 7.
See generally PITOT, supra note 2, at 119-121 (describing experiments conducted to
determine whether the tendency of cells to become malignant is a dominant or recessive
trait).
" R.A. Weinberg, A Molecular Basis of Cancer, 249 Sci. AM. 26.
1984-85]
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without cessation.2 Some of these oncogenes also have been located in
chromosones other than those to which they were originally attached. On
these chromosones, the oncogenes are located near genes responsible for
the rapid transcription of antibodies.2 7 Additionally, it is suspected that
more than one process may be necessary in order for a cell to become
cancerous. As one author described oncogenes:
Carcinogenesis appears to be a multistep process. Evidence from
a variety of sources indicates that a normal cell must suffer sev-
eral independent alterations before it becomes a bona fide tumor
cell. A point mutation that gives rise to an aberrant version of a
single protein represents only a single step affecting a single gene.
Presumably the creation of an oncogene fulfills one requirement
for making a tumor, but there are other necessary steps; the
oncogene may be necessary, but it is hardly sufficient.2"
The mechanism of cancer causation, when finally elaborated, may have
profound consequences for the legal system. If cancer can be initiated by
a single event, e.g., the translocation of a single nucleotide, then there is
no level of exposure to a carcinogen below which an effect cannot occur,
although the chances of the occurrence of that effect become more remote
as the dose decreases. That reduction of risk for a "one-hit" theory of
carcinogenesis would be linear since there is but one variable in the equa-
tion. That is, for any reduction of the dose by half, the effect would be
reduced proportionately.2 9 (This analysis, of course, greatly oversimpli-
fies the model because factors such as DNA repair which might reduce
the risk, or hormonal factors, which might increase susceptibility and
risk, are not taken into consideration)."s However if cancer induction re-
26 Id.
27 Id.
1Id. at 140. Cancer as a multiple step process is widely accepted in the scientific com-
munity. See generally OSHA CARCINOoEN POLICY, supra note 1, at 5017-23 (many witnesses
testified that cancer progresses through a number of stages of development). One researcher
noted: "Cancer seems to develop progressively through a number of stages, each of which
can be influenced by chemicals or other environmental factors, interacting with host factors
such as nutrition, hormone levels, etc." Id. at 5019 (testimony of Dr. Emmanuel Farber).
,1 One scientist testifying before OSHA stated: "If individual cancers arise from an origi-
nal, single, transformed cell, then the statistical nature of the carcinogenic dose response
will be governed by the extreme tail of the "transformation" response distribution. The
effect of this is to make virtually any process of discrete events approximately linear at low
dose." Id. at 5023 (testimony of Mr. Richard Peto). OSHA further noted that even though a
number of witnesses disagreed, it would follow from the fact that cancer develops from a
single cell that cancer may be initiated by the interaction of a single molecule of the carcino-
gen with the critical target site in the cell. Id. at 5024. Later, speaking of cancer as a failure
of DNA repair, OSHA stated: "Strictly speaking, any failure in repair leaves open the possi-
bility of initiation of the carcinogenic process and so precludes the existence of a threshold."
Id. at 5127.
SO Scientists testifying before OSHA testified that there may exist a safe level of expo-
[Vol. 33:29
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quires multiple steps, two or more variables come into play and the
chances are more remote that a single dose of the carcinogen will cause all
the necessary effects.8' For example, a recent report on radiation carci-
nogenesis noted: If two independent single events are required, at differ-
ent gene loci, to produce malignant transformation, the model would be
quadratic (i.e., the effect would increase with the square of the dose). If
the order in which the genetic changes must occur is important, an even
higher power of dose might be required in the model. However, if the
gene loci are close enough together at times, a single event might affect
both gene loci, and a linear term might be needed, as well.3 2 Under these
circumstances, it may become more difficult to prove that a single sub-
stance to which someone was exposed "caused" the cancer, in the legal
sense.
33
Although scientists do not know what causes cancer in humans or how
it is caused, they do know that those exposed to certain substances ap-
pear to develop cancer more frequently than those not exposed. There are
two sources cited in support of this theory: observation and experimenta-
tion." One of the earliest noted observations was made by Sir Percival
sure to a carcinogen as for other toxins. OSHA CARCINOcN POLICY, supra note 1, at 5022
(testimony of Dr. Robert Squire). However, non-cancer toxic effects occur early, and the
symptoms may be reduced and reversed by reduction of dose. Id. at 5023 (testimony of Dr.
Umberto Saffiotti). With carcinogenic substances however, no safe level can be assumed
because the effect (cancer) is separated from the exposure by such a long latency period, the
effect cannot be modified by a reduction of dose (i.e., by the time cancer is discovered, it
isn't going to be affectuated by cessation of exposure). Also, because very small amounts of
carcinogenic substances can begin the damage that results in carcinogenesis, the determina-
tion of a safe level is hindered further.
" As one scientist has noted:
If multistage models are even approximately true, then the incidence rate for each
cancer is proportional to a product of more than one event rate, each with differ-
ent determinants, and it makes little sense to ask for the cause of a particular
cancer; each has more than one distinct cause.
OSHA CARCINOGEN POLICY, supra note 1, at 5019 (testimony of Mr. Richard Peto).
*1 National Academy of Sciences, Oversight Committee on Radioepidemiological Tables,
Assigned Share for Radiation as a Cause of Cancer, 63 (1984).
33 For example, Dr. Arthur Upton, then Director of the National Cancer Institute, said
in testimony to OSHA:
Cigarette smoking provides an example of the difficulty of quantifying the contri-
bution of a single factor .... The incidence of cancer in smokers and non-smokers
has been studied extensively; the excess rates of cancer in smokers are well estab-
lished; and from knowledge of the number of smokers, the total number of excess
cancers causally related with smoking can be calculated .... It would be reasona-
ble to conclude that smoking is one major cause of these cancers, in the sense that
they would not have occurred in the absence of smoking. However, it would not be
reasonable to conclude that smoking is the only cause. It is known, for example,
that at least two agents-alpha radiation and asbestos-act synergistically with
cigarette smoking in causing lung cancer in exposed workers. OSHA CARCINOGEN
POLICY, supra note 1, at 5020 (testimony of Dr. Arthur Upton).
s A. LILIENFELD & S. LILIENFELD, FOUNDATIONS OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 191 (2d ed. 1980)
1984-85]
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Pott, a British surgeon, who in 1775 observed that chimney sweeps had a
high incidence of cancer of the skin of the scrotum. Dr. Pott believed that
the soot, which lodged in the trousers of these workers, must have caused
the cancers."s In the late nineteenth century, other scientists observed
that in particular populations the occurrence of certain tumors seemed
excessive. Aniline dye workers, for example, were observed to suffer from
cancers of the bladder more often than the general population. In the
early twentieth century, it was observed that people who worked around
x-rays or other forms of radioactivity developed various types of cancer in
apparent excess. 87 In 1935, scientists diagnosed two cases of lung cancer
in asbestos workers.as However, as the debate concerning asbestos and
cancer causation demonstrates, it is not enough, from either a scientific or
a legal standpoint, for scientists simply to make an observation that two
events appear associated. More rigorous proof is necessaryS-9-proof which
may be provided by the science of epidemiology.
III. OCCUPATION AND OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS IN CANCER
CAUSATION
An issue which has been debated at length is the extent to which can-
cer is produced by environmental, including occupational, factors as op-
posed to factors that are genetic. Environmental factors, which are gener-
ally include habits such as smoking, alcohol use, lifestyle, diet, and
occupation, have been said to account for the majority of cancers.'0 Part
of this hypothesis stems from studies of worldwide cancer rates that ana-
lyze how cancer rates vary in different geographical locations and among
different populations. Though some cancers tend to occur more in partic-
[hereinafter cited as LILIENFELD]; OTA REPORT, supra note 4, at 113. Experimental studies
require the deliberate giving or withholding of a factor and observing the occurrence or lack
of occurrence of an effect. Ethical considerations, of course, preclude the administration of
suspected carcinogens to people, but it is possible to test agents thought to aid in prevention
or hoped to aid in treatment. OTA REPORT, supra note 4, at 137. Observations may be the
result of case reports or epidemiological studies. OSHA CARCINOGEN POLICY, supra note 1,
at 5044.
31 Schottenfeld & Haas, Carcinogens in the Workplace, 29 CA-A CANCER JOURNAL FOR
CLINICIANS 145-46 (May/June 1979).
M.B. SHIMKIN, supra note 15, at 165-66 (1977).
8 Id. at 247-50.
38 Gloyne, Two Cases of Squamous Carcinoma of the Lung Occurring in Asbestosis, 17
TUBERCLE 5-10 (Oct. 1935).
11 The observation of isolated cases of cancer in relation to a specific environmental fac-
tor may be misleading, as subsequent statistical evaluation of the data may show. PITOT,
supra note 2, at 75.
40 Schottenfeld & Haas, supra note 32, at 144. Various other sources have similarly as-
serted this. A listing of the sources is collected at OTA REPORT, supra note 4, at 65, and
OSHA CARCINOGEN POLICY, supra note 1, at 5027.
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ular racial or ethnic groups, most affect all groups equally.41 Further-
more, when certain migrant populations relocate, their cancer rates for
numerous organs begin to approximate the rates in the geographical area
into which they move. This type of change has been attributed to changes
in lifestyle. If genetic factors were responsible for the international differ-
ences in risk, the rates among population groups that migrate essentially
would remain fixed.42 Thus, there appears to be less dispute regarding
the percentage of environmentally-induced cancers than about the per-
centage of the subset of that group, occupationally-caused cancers.
The percentage of cancers believed to be the result of one's occupation
varies considerably. A frequently quoted figure is from one to five per-
cent.43 Other estimates range upwards to ten percent,44 and one widely-
quoted study indicated that a reasonable projection for the consequences
of past exposure to carcinogens in the workplace would be twenty-three
percent to thirty-eight percent of the overall cancer total; of that overall
sum, the projected asbestos related cancers would comprise thirteen to
eighteen percent.45 However, this particular report, which has never
been published, has been the subject of rather extensive criticism. 4 a
IV. EPIDEMIOLOGY
As pointed out, as a result of the lack of knowledge about what causes
cancer, or how it is caused, the only way to identify substances as carcino-
gens in humans is to observe a particular population with exposure to a
substance and determine if that population develops a greater number of
cancers than would be expected. In fact, one proposed definition for car-
cinogen states the following:
A carcinogen is an agent whose administration to previously un-
treated animals leads to a statistically significant increased inci-
dence of malignant neoplasms as compared with that in untreated
appropriate control animals, whether the control animals have
low or high spontaneous incidences of the neoplasms in question
.... Some agents, including promoters and immune suppres-
41 Weisburger & Williams, Metabolism of Chemical Carcinogens, in CANCER - A CoM-
PREHENSIVE TREATISE 241-42 (F.F. Becker 2d ed. 1982). See also, Fraumeni, GENETIC DETER-
MINANTS OF CANCER, in HOST ENVIRONMENT INTERACTIONS IN THE ETIOLOGY OF CANCER IN
MAN 7 IARC SCIENTIFIC PUBLICATIONS (1973). The interaction of an environmental and so-
called "host factor," such as genetic make-up (including immunologic and DNA repair fac-
tors), age, and hormonal and nutritional status, is the subject of much investigation. See
HOST FACTORS IN HUMAN CARCINOGENESIS, 39 IARC SCIENTIFIC PUBLICATIONS (1982).
4' Schottenfeld & Haas, supra note 32, at 144.
4s Id. at 145.
The study estimates are collected at OTA REPORT, supra note 4, at 86-7, 108-9.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, ESTIMATES OF THE FRACTION OF
CANCER IN THE UNITED STATES RELATED TO OCCUPATIONAL FACTORS (1978).
" See OTA REPORT, supra note 4, at 87-88.
1984-85]
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sants, can increase the incidence of malignant neoplasms in tis-
sues previously treated with subcarcinogenic doses of carcinogens;
such agents should not be termed carcinogens.' 7
Although this definition was developed with reference to experimental
animals, it applies with equal validity to human studies. The only differ-
ence, as noted, is that human epidemiology provides direct evidence
about cancer in man, and positive animal studies determine only that the
substance is a carcinogen in that species, indicating only that the sub-
stance is a potential human carcinogen.
4
Epidemiology is the study of patterns of disease occurrence in popula-
tions and factors which influence those patterns.49 Human epidemiologic
studies essentially are comprised of two types. In the first type, a pro-
spective study,50 scientists identify a substance or agent, the effects of
which they seek to investigate, for example, benzene. A population which
has been exposed to that substance is then identified and followed in or-
der to verify the health outcomes of that group. These outcomes are then
compared with those of people who have not been exposed to the sub-
stance at issue. A good example of a prospective study is that involving
the survivors of the atomic bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 51 That
study, which focused on radiation, identified as many persons as possible
who had been exposed to radiation from the bombs and has followed the
group to note what outcomes have occurred.5 2  However, rather than
merely following a group, an investigator may choose a population for
study, go back in time to a given date, identify the group as of that date,
and then trace it over time, usually to the present. This type of study is
known as a nonconcurrent or historical prospective study.5"
In the second type of study, the retrospective or case-control
'" PITOT, supra note 2, at 29-30. See E.C. Miller & J.A. Miller, Mechanisms of Chemical
Carcinogenesis: Nature of Proximate Carcinogens and Interactions with Macromolecules,
18 PHARMACOLOGICAL RESEARCH 805 (1966). Other authors have taken a much broader view
of what constitutes a carcinogen. Richard Peto defines a carcinogen as any external agent
that directly or indirectly increases the likelihood that a transformed cell will pass through
one of the stages involved in the process of development of cancer. OSHA CARCINOGEN POL-
icy, supra note 1, at 5022. The NCAB Subcommittee on Environmental Carcinogenesis
pointed out that the term "carcinogen" should be used in the broad sense, because it is not
possible to differentiate clearly between initiating agents and certain modifying factors.
OSHA CARCINOGEN POLICY, supra note 1, at 5022.
OTA REPORT, supra note 4, at 114 (Table 23).
4' LILIENFELD, supra note 31, at 3.
50 Id. at 226-7; see also OTA REPORT, supra note 4, at 138; Schottenfeld & Haas, supra
note 32, at 147.
" See LILIENFELD, supra note 31, at 227; Schottenfeld & Haas, supra note 32, at 147.
" See, e.g., G.W. Beebe, H. Kato & C.A. Land, Mortality Experience of Atomic Bomb
Survivors 1950-1975, LIFE SPAN STUDY REPORT 8 (1978).
11 LIENFELD, supra note 31, at 227.
[Vol. 33:29
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol33/iss1/4
CANCER AND TOXIC SUBSTANCES
study, 4 scientists identify certain outcomes about which they are inter-
ested, for example, leukemia. A population, all of whose members have
the particular outcome, is then selected and is matched with another pop-
ulation which is similar in as many respects as possible to the study pop-
ulation, except that its members do not have the outcome. Comparing the
members of the two populations, the scientists determine whether the
study population was exposed to anything different prior to the develop-
ment of the outcome than was the so-called "control" population. An ex-
ample of a case-control study is the Oxford Survey of Childhood Cancer,
which identified all English children under the age of ten who had been
diagnosed with cancer. A control group was then selected and matched
for age and a variety of other factors; the controls differed only in that
they did not have cancer. The cases and controls were then traced in or-
der to identify any differences. In the Oxford Survey, the researchers
found that the only real difference was that the cases were exposed to
more radiation while they were still fetuses than the controls. This
prompted the researchers to suggest that pelvic irradiation was the cause
of cancer in the cases. 55
There are two types of problems commonly associated with epidemio-
logical studies. These problems may be divided into those of establishing
an association between an agent and a cancer, and, if an association is
established, problems of determining whether the association so estab-
lished is a causal one, i.e. whether the exposure caused the disease.
A. Problems of Establishing an Association
One of the major problems with establishing an association is determin-
ing if the number of cases observed is statistically and significantly differ-
ent than the number of cases expected. A discussion of the limitations of
the statistical method is beyond the scope of this article. However, some
general comments may be in order. A particularly difficult problem with
attempting to detect the effect of a weak carcinogen (or low doses of any
carcinogen) is that a large study population is necessary. As Dr. Robert
Hoover of the National Cancer Institute testified before the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA):
[Epidemiology] is quite weak at identifying the causes of very low
levels of risk. Very small differences in risk between a group ex-
posed to some substance versus that in a group not exposed to it
could be due to a variety of reasons: for example, chance, or other
differences between the exposed and unexposed which we either
do not know about or cannot adequately control for. Because of
Id. at 194. See also OTA REPORT, supra note 4, at 138.
5' A. Stewart, J. Webb & D. Hewitt, A Survey of Childhood Malignancies, I Barr. MED.
J. 1495-1508 (1958).
1984-851
11Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1984
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
this, it becomes next to impossible to say with any assurity [sic]
that a very low level of risk is caused by a similarly low level ex-
posure to some substance."
Dr. Hoover further stated that the lowest excess cancer risk, that was
directly observable in a group of exposed persons and is generally ac-
cepted as being due to that exposure, is the thirty percent excess risk of
childhood leukemia found in children exposed to radiation in utero dur-
ing the last trimester of pregnancy.5 7 In fact Dr. Hoover said: "Indeed, it
has taken us some 20 years to become reasonably convinced of this 30%
excess risk."58 Another witness before OSHA pointed out that "[flew ep-
idemiological studies of occupational cancer have been of adequate sensi-
tivity to detect anything smaller than a 50% increase in the incidence of
cancer over that found in the general population. ' 59 A study of the risks
posed by saccharin, conducted by the National Academy of Sciences, in-
dicated that "assuming that saccharin is a carcinogen of low potency in
humans . . . the number of bladder cancers studied have been too small
• . . to demonstrate a statistically significant difference [between the
cases and the controls].""0 Another witness before OSHA, commenting
on the insensitivity of methods for detecting an association between a
chemical exposure and cancer, noted that such an association has only
been made when "an increased incidence of a tumor of an unusual type
was noted or when an unusual clustering of a common tumor occurred in
a particular population."'"
The problem is illustrated further by an example from a report to the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission on the feasibility of epidemiologic stud-
ies of the effects of low levels of ionizing radiation (the "Dreyer Report").
The report took one theoretical model that predicted a single dose of ten
remss 2 of radiation to a population of 100,000 would produce 200 excess
cancers. Noting that the Third National Cancer Survey projected an oc-
currence of 20,000 cancers in the same population (making the excess
.2%), the authors of the report concluded that it would be "practically
impossible to distinguish such an increment . . s The authors did
16 OSHA CARCINOGEN POLICY, supra note 1, at 5040 (testimony of Dr. Robert Hoover).
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 5049 (testimony of Dr. Richard Bates).
60 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, COMMI'TrEE FOR A STUDY ON SACCHARIN AND FOOD
SAFETY POLICY 3-89 (1978).
*1 OSHA CARCINOGEN POLICY, supra note 1, at 5044 (testimony of Dr. Peter Goldman).
" A rem is a measure of radiation dose. It is equivalent to the absorbed dose in rads
times a quality factor to equalize biologic effects. The major quality factor is generally to
correct for the linear energy transfer (LET). A rad represents an absorbed energy of 100
ergs per gram of tissue. R. SCHEELE & WAKLEY, ELEMENTS OF RADIATION PROTECTION (1975).
63 N.A. DREYER, THE FEASIBILITY OF EPIDEMIOLOGIC INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HEALTH EF-
FECTS OF Low LEVEL IONIZING RADIATION 36, 54 (1980).
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note that: "To establish that a difference in cancer rates of 0.2% is statis-
tically significant at the .05 level in a single tail test with 0.9 power would
require a sample size of about 700,000 each, exposed and unexposed." 6'
The Dreyer Report also pointed out that the sensitivity of the analysis
could be greatly improved if most of the excess cancers were of a type
that is normally rare and which, thus, represented at least a fifty percent
or greater increase in the rate of that type, instead of a one percent
increase. 6
With respect to some exposures, such as radiation, there is evidence of
an association (and causation) at high doses because the effect is pro-
nounced, i.e. many cancers of various types occur when a few would be
expected. However, as the dose of radiation decreases, so does its ef-
fect,"6 and, as stated, any sort of effect is much more difficult to detect at
low dose levels. As one report evaluating saccharin stated: "Humans are
usually exposed to carcinogens in doses far smaller than are used in
animal experiments. The effects are consequently less frequent, and the
number of people whose experience needs to be judged to detect the can-
cer effect is much greater."6 "
Efforts have been made to extrapolate from the effects of high doses of
some of these substances or agents to the possible effect at low doses,
although no data exists for the lower levels, and construct dose-response
curves for these low levels of exposure.6 " These efforts have been ham-
pered because it is not known to what extent DNA repairs itself at low
levels of exposure"' or to what extent fractionation of dose reduces theeffect of carcinogens. 70
64 The concept of statistical significance is discussed in the OSHA CARCINOGEN POLICY,
supra note 1, at 5096-100. In this example, the .05 is known as the p-value:
The role of chance is assessed by the p-value, which indicates the probability that
an observed association exists by chance alone. A small p-value implies that
chance is an unlikely explanation. Yet, no matter how small the p-value, the re-
sults can still be due to chance. Since rare events do occur spontaneously, other
problems in interpreting p-values involve the adequacy of the sample size and
sufficiency of the power of the statistical test used.
DREYER, supra note 60, at 54.
66 DREYER, supra note 60, at 54.
66 This phenomenon occurs with any agent in which there is a dose-response relation-
ship. The higher the dose, the greater the effect. Inversely, the lower the dose, the more
minimal the effect.
SOSHA CARCINOGEN POLICY, supra note 1, at 5048.
68 See, e.g., THE EFFECTS ON POPULATION OF EXPOSURE TO Low LEVELS OF IONIZING RADI-
ATION: 1980, THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, COMMITTEE ON THE BIO-
LOGICAL EFFECTS OF IONIZING RADIATION 136-37 (1980) (BEIR III).
9 PROBLEMS IN ASSESSING THE CANCER RISKS OF Low-LEVEL IONIZING RADIATION 5-18, 5-
19 (1981).
10 See also NATIONAL COUNCIL ON RADIATION PROTECTION AND MEASUREMENTS, INFLUENCE
OF DOSE AND ITS DISTRIBUTION IN TIME ON DOSE-RESPONSE RELATIONSHIPS FOR Low LET
RADIATIONS, NCRP REPORT No. 64, 170-74 (1980).
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Another problem in establishing the association is that there may be a
prolonged latent period between exposure to a carcinogen and the devel-
opment of a frank cancer. Failure to follow up on study groups for long
periods of time may lead to "false negative" results," i.e. those which
show no effect although one actually exists. One of the witnesses who tes-
tified before OSHA noted that "[iut may be that 40 years continued expo-
sure is extremely dangerous, but that 15 years of continued exposure con-
fers what is a negligible risk until further time has elapsed.""2
Problems associated with both group size and latency periods were ad-
dressed before OSHA by Dr. Irving Selikoff:
I think that Dr. Nicholson's mention before of the asbestos re-
lated cancer of the lung in non-smoking asbestos workers teaches
us a great deal. We looked at a fairly good sized group in New
York City of the 370 men. They were all more than 20 years from
onset . . . and yet, by 1967 we did not see a single case of lung
cancer among the non-smokers. . . . It was not until we followed
2,000 people for 10 more years that we were able to find eight
cases against 1.82 expected.
73
Therefore, as summarized in the Dreyer Report:
The general approach to the analysis of epidemiologic studies is
similar for both case-control and cohort studies. This involves es-
timating a measure of association . . . between the disease and
exposure, statistical testing of that estimator (hypothesis testing),
calculating of a confidence interval around the estimate, and ad-
justing for confounding variables."'
The measure of association discussed by the Dreyer Report is generally
couched in terms of "relative risk." As noted, even if an epidemiological
study has been conducted in accordance with accepted principles, all that
can be shown is that the risk associated with exposure to a given agent
exceeds that which occurs in a control population. The ratio of the ob-
served cases to the expected cases is called the risk ratio or the relative
risk. For example, assume that the naturally occurring incidence of a
given cancer in a given population (adjusted for age and sex) is six. As-
sume further that for the population under study, the incidence of that
cancer was nine. Of these nine observed cases, six could be said to have
7 OSHA CARCINOGEN POLICY, supra note 1, at 5050.
Id. (testimony of Mr. Richard Peto).
' Id. at 5049-50.
DREYER, supra note 60, at 259. A study is positive when the upper confidence limit of
the frequency of the effect observed in the comparison population falls below the lower
confidence limit of the frequency of that effect observed in the study population, and the
difference is not explained by limitations in the design of the study, biases, or confounding
variables. See OSHA CARCINOGEN POLICY, supra note 1, at 5046.
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been "expected" and the ratio of observed to expected (nine divided by
six) is 1.5. However, if the disease under study is one that occurs in the
general population, as does cancer, and is not distinguishable as being
induced by a given substance or agent, there is no way to determine
which cases occurred naturally and which occurred by virtue of whatever
caused the excess.
Therefore, epidemiology alone is not satisfying to those who want to
establish the probability that a given case is related to particular expo-
sure. It is for this reason that the concept of probability of causation or
percentage probability was developed. By means of this formula, the pro-
portion of all cases of the disease in the total population attributable to a
specific exposure may be calculated. The formula is:
percentage probability - RR 
1
RR
where RR = relative risk.7'Utilizing the numbers from the above example
(a 1.5 relative risk), it may be calculated that the percentage of the risk of
cancer in the exposed population attributable to the agent is 331/3 percent
(1.5 minus 1 divided by 1.5). This also reflects the chance that any given
individual in the population developed his or her cancer as the result of
exposure to a particular agent.
By inserting several numbers into the formula, it can be seen that any
time the relative risk exceeds 2.0, the chances that the agent caused the
cancer in a given person is greater than 50 percent, i.e., more likely than
not. However, the most that can be said about this analysis is that, as a
matter of statistical probability, the chances that the individual acquired
cancer due to the agent are whatever is shown by the attributable risk.
Even with a relative risk greater than 2.0, an individual could be a natu-
rally occurring case. Conversely, with a relative risk of less than 2.0, the
cancer could still be agent-induced.
B. Problems With Establishing Causal Significance
Even if an increased relative risk is identified in a given population,
however, it must still be determined whether the established association
is of causal significance. As one of the witnesses testified in the OSHA
Carcinogen Policy hearings:
A point that has not come out, really, is that there is no such
thing as proof, and the acceptance or rejection of a hypothesis is
really a subjective phenomenon based as much as possible on ob-
,' The confidence limit, or interval, is the range of values which could be right at the
level of statistical significance decided upon. LILIENFELD, supra note 31, at 331-38. P.E. En-
terline, Attributability in the Face of Uncertainty. 78 CHEST, No. 2, p. 377 (Aug. 1980
Supp.)
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jective data ....
One of the criteria you have to build in . . . is does the study
make sense. There are far more problems in the design of the
study and the data collection than there are in the statistical
tests."
Similarly, the first Surgeon General's Report on Smoking and Health
stated: "The causal significance of an association is a matter of judgment
which goes beyond any statement of statistical probability." 77 There are
a variety of criteria for determining whether a given result "makes sense."
These are summarized in the OSHA CARCINOGEN POLICY." One widely
accepted set of criteria indicate that the factors most appropriate for
evaluating an association are consistency, strength, temporal relationship,
coherence and specificity.7 9 Essentially, consistency means repeatability
or experimental replication, but it may also be demonstrated by showing
diverse investigative approaches which produce similar results. The
strength of an association may be expressed in terms of relative risk or
odds ratio. Temporal relationship means that the presumed cause always
precedes the observed effect. Coherence embraces the concept of biologi-
cal plausibility. The criterion of specificity implies that there is a predic-
tive pattern of effects likely to occur with a frequency greater than ran-
dom chance if the antecedent event is of causal significance.80
The International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), in the pre-
amble to its monograph series on carcinogens, indicates that a study
which shows a positive association between an agent and a cancer "may
be interpreted as implying causality, to a greater or lesser extent," if five
criteria are met:
1. There is no identifiable positive bias.
Positive bias means that factors in the design or the execution of
the study lead erroneously to a more strongly positive association
between an agent and disease than, in fact, exists. An example of
positive bias in a case-control study would be more nearly com-
plete ascertainment of exposure to the agent in the cases studied
than in the controls. An example of positive bias in a cohort study
would be more nearly complete detection of cancer in individuals
exposed to the agent than in individuals not exposed to the agent.
2. The possibility of positive confounding has been considered.
Confounding refers to the extraneous influence of factors, other
than the one sought to be measured, in the association with the
76 OSHA CARCINOGEN POLICY, supra note 1, at 5051 (testimony of Dr. Robert Morgan).
77 SMOKING AND HEALTH, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE To THE SURGEON GENERAL
OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 20 (1964).
78 OSHA CARCINOGEN POLICY, supra note 1, at 5044-46.
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risk of cancer. Positive confounding refers to the situation in
which the association between the agent and the disease is ren-
dered more strongly positive than it really is as a result of an
association between the agent and another agent which either
causes or prevents the disease. One of the best examples of posi-
tive confounding is the positive association between coffee con-
sumption and lung cancer. Drinking coffee does not, to anybody's
knowledge, in fact, cause lung cancer, but the association between
the two results from their joint association with cigarette
smoking.
3. The association is unlikely to be due to chance alone.
4. The association is strong.
5. There is a dose-response relationship."1
The IARC Preamble further states:
In some instances a single epidemiological study may be strongly
indicative of a cause-effect relationship, however, the most con-
vincing evidence of causality comes when several independent
studies done under different circumstances result in "positive"
findings.
2
Keeping these criteria in mind, it may be useful to review some of the
advantages and disadvantages of the retrospective (case-control) studies,
and the prospective (cohort) studies. The retrospective study requires a
smaller sample since the disease under study is already identified. The
time involved in doing the study is also short since the pertinent events
have already occurred. The size of the sample depends on the prevalence
of the exposure to the "causal" factor or factors, the relative risk of dis-
ease the investigators deem it important to detect, and the acceptable
levels of false positive and false negative results.8 " This type of study is
more useful in studying rare diseases because confirmed cases constitute
the study group. If the association between the factor and the disease is
relatively strong, the number of cases necessary to show a significant in-
crease is correspondingly small.
Some of the major problems in retrospective studies include: (1) bias -
81 OSHA CARCINOGEN POLICY, supra note 1 at 5044 (citing 17 IARC 18 (1978)).
82 Id. In an editorial comment printed in the New York Times on the subject of the
alleged use of toxic chemicals in Southeast Asia, the writer set out four rules of thumb that
are applicable to epidemiological studies: (1) Science is founded on careful observation; (2)
A difficult test or measurement must be repeated by a second scientist in case the first
scientist made an error; (3) Science is cumulative and to ignore what is on the record is to
build on air; and (4) Controls must be properly matched or conclusions are invalid. New
York Times, Feb. 14, 1984, A26, Col. 1.
"' False positives result when there is, in fact, no effect from the agent, but statistical
tests show there is an effect. False negatives result when there is actually an effect of the
agent, but the study shows none. Schottenfeld & Haas, supra note 32, at 148-50.
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the subject's recall of earlier events may be distorted by knowledge of the
disease; (2) lack of information - necessary information may be lost or
incomplete, or the subject or his family may not be able to recall the
critical information; and (3) control selection - controls must be selected
to match as many characteristics of the cases as possible. Ideally, controls
should be selected from the same population as the cases. On occasion,
multiple control groups must be used. These may come from the same
hospital, neighborhood, family or workplace. 4
Prospective studies present yet another set of problems. They are more
expensive since most of the data must be recorded, and a larger sample is
usually needed since the outcomes are not known. Furthermore, due to
the long latent period which occurs between exposure and the occurrence
of some diseases, a long follow-up period is often required. As with retro-
spective studies, to determine sample size, the investigators must decide
what level of false positives and false negatives they are willing to accept
and what relative risk they regard as important. However, the sample size
also depends on the expected incidence of the disease in those not ex-
posed. If the incidence of the disease is low in the exposed and unexposed
group, a very large sample will be needed to show significant differences
between the groups. In a prospective study, as in a retrospective study,
the incidence of disease is compared with what is "expected." Thus, the
selection of the "normals" must be made with care. Additional problems
include study subjects who may be unable to follow-up, or in the noncur-
rent (historical) approach, documentation of past exposures or the tracing
of individuals may prove incomplete. 5 Finally, diagnostic criteria and
methods may change over time.86
One author on the subject of epidemiological studies has suggested that
the retrospective (case-control) study is the most suitable for the exami-
nation of rare diseases, in "fishing" for multiple factors of uncertain sig-
nificance and for the initial exploration of a specific hypothesis regarding
causation. The prospective (cohort) study, by directly measuring the risk
of persons with a particular characteristic, is more suitable for testing hy-
potheses that have been developed from prior retrospective studies. 7
In summary, then, two points should be made about epidemiological
studies. The first is that even if an association is found between a factor
and a disease, it is still a matter of judgment whether that association is
of causal significance. The second point is that epidemiology, by defini-
* Id. at 148.
" Incomplete exposure histories may result in an understatement of the effect of the
factor. Incomplete tracing of individuals may result in understatement of the effect of the
factor (if, for example, untraced individuals exposed to the factor have the disease) or over-
statement of that effect, (if, for example, untraced individuals exposed to the factor don't
have the disease).
Schottenfield & Haas, supra note 32, at 149.
87 Id. at 147.
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tion, is a study of populations, not individuals. Even if an association of
causal significance is found, the question still remains: did the substance
or agent in question cause the disease in the particular person in whom
the legal system is interested? As noted, the answer to that question can
only be a statistical one. Therefore, from a scientific point of view, the
major problems of primary importance in any analysis of the validity of
epidemiological studies are the problems of determining whether an asso-
ciation is causal and the problems associated with statistical analysis.
From a legal point of view, however, even if a causal association is estab-
lished, can it ever be said with reasonable medical certainty (i.e. more
likely than not), that a particular person developed the disease from the
factor in question? The next section will examine how courts have dealt
with this problem.
V. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF EPIDEMIOLOGY
Courts faced with diseases of unknown etiology may either consider un-
familiar medical methodology or disregard it in favor of familiar legal the-
ories. The resulting situation is an anomalous one-a judicial system re-
quiring legal certainties yet dealing with claims fraught with medical
uncertainty.
Such tension stems from the difficult problems of proof presented by
diseases of unknown causes. Under precepts of traditional tort law, plain-
tiffs are required to establish the element of causation "by preponderance
of the evidence."8 8 In disease-related cases, this translates into proof of
causation to a "reasonable medical certainty." Yet, because the cause of
some diseases, such as cancer, is unknown, plaintiffs must rely on proof
other than direct evidence as a basis for establishing an action.
The introduction of epidemiological studies is one means by which
plaintiffs may satisfy the causation burden. Case law on cancer and epi-
demiology is scarce. Courts have considered epidemiology in other, re-
lated contexts, however, and their reception to this type of proof may
guide future attempts for litigating cancer-related injuries.
Epidemiological proof was considered extensively in cases involving the
swine flu vaccine and Guillain-Barre Syndrome (GBS).89 In In re [Swine
88 See PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 236 (4th ed. 1971).
" GBS is a disease affecting the peripheral nervous system. It has been defined as "a
syndrome described as encephalitis of virus origin consisting of absence of fever, pain or
tenderness in the muscles, motor weakness, abolition of tendon reflexes, and great increase
of protein in the cerebrospinal fluid without increase in cells." Alvarez v. United States, 495
F. Supp. 1188 (D. Colo. 1980) (citing DORLAND'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY (1965)). The bulk of
cases discussing GBS are linked to the swine flu vaccination program. In 1976, the federal
government began the Swine Flu Immunization Program in an attempt to avoid a swine flu
epidemic. 495 F. Supp. at 1190. One third of the adult population was vaccinated. Id. The
program began pursuant to the Swine Flu Act, which also provided for a cause of action
against the government for any personal injury or wrongful death attributable to the vac-
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Flu Immunization] Products Liability Litigation, Alvarez v. United
States,9" the federal district court in Colorado considered a claim under
the Federal Tort Claims Act." A sixty-three year old woman alleged
that the United States was liable for her diagnosed condition of GBS; it
was not disputed that she suffered from GBS.93 The issue facing the
court, instead, was whether the plaintiff's GBS was caused by her swine
flu vaccination. The court considered neurological, virological, immuno-
logical, epidemiological, and pathological evidence before finding in favor
of the United States.
9 3
The court recognized that because the exact cause of GBS remains un-
known, "we must consider epidemiologic studies to determine if the dis-
ease is causally related to an antecedent event."9 '  In particular, the
court considered testimony of Dr. Lawrence Schonberger, 9' defendant's
expert, who had previously authored a study concluding that an etiologi-
cal relationship existed between the swine flu vaccine and GBS.96 His
study revealed that GBS was expected to occur in nine to nineteen per-
sons per million population each year in the United States, 7 compared to
the incidence of GBS among the vaccinated population of seven times
cine, an exclusive remedy, and application of the Federal Torts Claim Act to such suits. 42
U.S.C. § 247(b)(K)(2)(A) (1976).
A surveillance program was also instituted to consider possible problems from the vacci-
nation program. The Center for Disease Control in Atlanta, Georgia compiled statistics on
the incidence of GBS among the vaccinated and unvaccinated population during the course
of the program. A statistical correlation resulted from this surveillance which showed that
the risk of incurring GBS among the vaccinated population was seven times greater than the
risk of incurring the disease among the general unvaccinated population. These results led
to the eventual cessation of the program. Subsequently, over a hundred suits were brought
alleging injury pursuant to the program. 495 F. Supp. at 1191.
90 495 F. Supp. at 1188.
91 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (1982).
92 495 F. Supp at 1191. In addition, it was not contested that the epidemiological studies
showed an association between the swine flu vaccine and GBS. The district court relied
upon the final pretrial order of the multi-district litigation panel for this conclusion. See In
re Swine Flu Immunization Products Liability Litigation, 464 F. Supp. 949 (D.D.C. 1979),
which provided that when the government stipulated to the plaintiff having GBS, the plain-
tiff need not assert a theory of liability but only proof of causation. Id. at 953.
92 495 F. Supp. at 1207.
91 Id. at 1203. Unlike cancer, GBS is associated with various antecedent events including
viral infections (respiratory or gastroenteric), bacterial infections, surgery, fever treatment,
malignant diseases and vaccines, thus facilitating proof of an association with the vaccine
and GBS. Id. at 1195 (citing DYcK, PERIPHERAL NEUROPATHV 1114 (1975)).
95 Schonberger relied upon the article, which he principally authored, Guillain Barre
Syndrome Following Vaccination in the National Influenza Immunization Program, U.S.
1976-77, 110 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 105-122 (1979), in which 1098 cases of GBS were ana-
lyzed. 495 F. Supp. at 1203. Schonberger and his colleagues found that there was "an etio-
logic relationship between the swine flu vaccine and GBS, but that such relationship ex-
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that amount.e8 (This would produce a relative risk of 7, or a vaccine
induced probability of causation in any one patient of 6/7, or 85%.)
The issues raised regarding the epidemiologic study concerned its relia-
bility on a temporal basis. The study showed a return to the normal inci-
dence of GBS in the vaccinated population after a period of ten weeks
from the date of vaccination. Plaintiff, however, was not diagnosed as
having GBS until seven months after her vaccination, and thus, her GBS
did not fall within the range of the noted association. Notwithstanding
plaintiff's attempts to undermine the epidemiological statistics, the court
ruled that plaintiff's GBS was not causally related to her vaccination."
ga Id.
Plaintiff argued that the epidemiologic study was inconclusive and of limited value as
applied to her case of GBS because (1) the study was not intended to determine for how
long a causal connection existed, and (2) only a limited number of people could have been
analyzed past the ten week point. The court, however, ruled that a substantial number of
cases had been analyzed and that a drop-off in the incidence of GBS beyond a certain time
period became apparent as a result of determining the causal connection between the vacci-
nation and GBS. Furthermore, the time of the association need not have been the primary
focus of the study in order to be conclusive. Id. at 1205.
Other courts considered similar attacks on the study to those raised in Alvarez, but courts
were steadfast in their adherence to the ten week limit. The study was later revised to re-
flect adjustments in reporting; these changes, however, did not alter the time limitation
attributable to the return of the incidence of GBS among the vaccinated population after
ten weeks to normally expected rates. For example, plaintiff in one case demonstrated the
manipulation of the epidemiological statistics. In Varga v. United States, 566 F. Supp. 987
(N.D. Ohio 1983), plaintiff's expert attempted to undermine the temporal cut-off for estab-
lishing a causal relationship between GBS and swine flu vaccine subsequent to the revised
study. First, plaintiff's expert noted that the observed rate of GBS in the unimmunized
population was not necessarily the "true rate." Id. at 993. By changing the baseline rate
number of GBS occurrence in the unimmunized population, plaintiff's expert concluded
that an "enhanced relative risk" of incurring GBS after a swine flu shot existed during the
eleventh and twelfth week after vaccination. Id. at n.8. Notwithstanding defendant's ex-
pert's testimony that his own studies had "many opportunities for error," the court rejected
the plaintiffs' expert's testimony of a re-estimated baseline, his contention of underreport-
ing, and his arguments of bias within the subjective analysis of symptoms from cases desig-
nated as having insufficient information, and denied recovery. Id. at 995-96, 1012. See also
Gates v. United States, 707 F.2d 141 (10th Cir. 1983) (GBS developed eleven months after
vaccination; relief denied because of failure to prove causation); Padgett v. United States,
553 F. Supp. 794 (W.D. Tex. 1982) (denial of recovery for GBS developed sixteen weeks
after shot); Cook v. United States, 545 F. Supp. 306 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (twelve and one-half
weeks); Migliorini v. United States, 521 F. Supp. 1210 (N.D. Fla. 1981) (denied recovery
because developed GBS twenty-one weeks after vaccine); Lima v. United States, 508 F.
Supp. 897 (D. Colo. 1981) (sixteen weeks); Hixenbaugh v. United States, 506 F. Supp. 461
(N.D. Ohio 1980) (fifteen months).
These courts all accepted as persuasive the epidemiological study authored by the Center
for Disease Control and relied upon the statistics as proof of causation and its temporal
restrictions to deny recovery to the GBS victim. At least one court, however, noted that it
did not rely on the epidemiological proof and instead based its decision to deny recovery
solely on clinical and neurological proof. Robinson v. United States, 533 F. Supp. 320 (E.D.
Mich. 1982). In Robinson, plaintiff developed GBS seventeen weeks after receiving the vac-
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The swine flu vaccine also presented the courts with more opportuni-
ties to consider epidemiological proof when plaintiffs began attributing
other ailments to the swine flu vaccine; unlike the GBS cases, however,
defendants in those cases forcefully contested the epidemiological proof.
For example, in Szczepaniak v. United States,00 the plaintiff offered
an epidemiological study as proof of a causal relationship between the
swine flu vaccine and transverse myelitis."' The government denied that
the vaccine caused any of plaintiff's injuries. The court considered testi-
mony from six medical expert witnesses, including plaintiff's epidemiol-
ogy witness, Dr. Goldfield. Dr. Goldfield testified that the number of
cases of transverse myelitis actually observed in the vaccinated popula-
tion was significantly greater than the number that would be ex-
pected,1 0 2 and concluded that Szczepaniak's transverse myelitis was
"caused" by the administration of the swine flu vaccine." 3
The court specifically rejected the epidemiologic proof,1'0 however, and
cination. The court denied damages, and explained its reason for not following the lead of
the other swine flu courts: "I would reach the same result if the epidemiological data were
entirely excluded since statistical evidence cannot establish cause and effect." Id. at 330.
The court was evidently dubious about the reliability of the statistical evidence presented;
defendant's own expert testified to the questions surrounding the use of epidemiological
proof:
[T]here is no epidemiological or biostatistical method which definitively estab-
lishes whether an individual case of GBS is caused by the individual's receipt of
the swine flu vaccine or by other factors. At most, one can examine statistical
correlation and then within a chosen interval of error, determine whether GBS is
more likely than not associated with swine flu vaccine in a particular period after
receipt of the vaccination.
Id. at 326.
00 No. 80-990 (D. Mass. 1983) (available June 1, 1984 on LExis, Genefed library, cases
file).
101 Transverse myelitis is a neurological disorder in which a lesion is produced across the
spinal cord. In Szczepaniak, plaintiff suffered from the condition as a result of unknown
causes. He experienced numbness and weakness on one side, difficulty with his bowel and
bladder, and episodes of incontinence and sexual problems. Plaintiff also testified to bouts
of frustration and depression as a result of his condition. Id.
100 Szczepaniak, No. 80-990, slip op. at 10.
'o' Id. The court also considered two other experts for plaintiff: Dr. Locke, a treating
physician, who concluded that a causal relationship existed on the basis that the plaintiff's
symptoms developed soon after the vaccine and "stabilized" soon thereafter, and Dr. Poser,
a neurologist, who based his conclusion of a causal relationship on medical literature, his
examination of the plaintiff, and the plaintiff's medical records. Id. at 9, 12-13. The court
found most persuasive the former's testimony. He dismissed the neurological expert opinion
because the only medical literature upon which the expert based his opinion was of his own
authorship. Id. at 13.
'o, The court stated:
I can accept that Dr. Goldfield's epidemiological studies might be of some interest
and probative value in the medical field, as they tend to show a statistical associa-
tion between the occurrence of transverse myelitis and administration of the swine
flu vaccine. However, while I accept that this is a valid technique in the field of
[Vol. 33:29
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concluded that under Massachusetts law, more than "expert recognition
of mere possibility" is required for establishment of proximate cause. The
court accordingly denied relief.'
Epidemiologic studies fared far better in a case involving a connection
between a product and the introduction of a disease-causing bacteria. In
Kehm v. Proctor & Gamble,' the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ac-
cepted epidemiological studies as proof of the connection between toxic
shock syndrome (TSS) and defendant's product, Rely tampons.' 7 The
lower court in Kehm considered plaintiffs' claim that Rely tampons were
defective and unreasonably dangerous and that Proctor & Gamble failed
to warn Rely users of this."0 8 The appellate court affirmed the lower
court's judgement and verdict against the defendant-manufacturer for
$300,000.
On appeal, Proctor & Gamble contested the trial court's admission of
epidemiology, I do not find bare statistics to be of great probatiue oalue in estab-
lishing causation in the matter at hand. Epidemiology . .. does not as a disci-
pline purport to isolate the sole cause for a single individual's medical ailment.
However useful it may be as a diagnostic, therapeutic, or preventative tool, the
broadbased statistical conclusions that are its product do not alone establish the
legal causation necessary for demonstrating liability in a court of law.
Szczepaniak, slip op. at 10-11 (emphasis added).
"I Courts, when considering epidemiology as proof of causation, are often ambivalent in
their acceptance of these studies. An offer of epidemiological proof to the Szczepaniak
court, led to an admonishment of the plaintiff for relying on medical evidence in a court of
law, while the failure to provide such statistics, in other forums, led to a failure for lack of
proof of causation. See Marneef v. United States, 533 F. Supp. 129, 134 (E.D. Mich. 1981)
(no epidemiological basis for concluding relationship between swine flu vaccine and periph-
eral neuropathy); Adelson v. United States, 523 F. Supp. 459 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (insufficient
evidence of statistical correlation showing causal relationship between swine flu vaccine and
chronic inflammatory polyradiculoneuropathy led court to conclude no proximate cause).
But see Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F. 2d 1529, 1535-6 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (a cause-
effect relationship need not be clearly established by animal or epidemiological studies
before a doctor can testify that, in his opinion, such a relationship exists .... Products
liability law does not preclude recovery until a "statistically significant" number of people
have been injured.)
'o Kehm v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 724 F.2d 613 (8th Cir. 1983).
Rely tampons were manufactured and placed on national markets by Proctor & Gam-
ble during late 1979. According to facts found by the lower court, TSS was first identified in
November of 1978. Id. at 616. It is typically associated with staphylococcus aureoles and its
symptoms include fever, vomiting, diarrhea, low blood pressure, rash, and skin-peeling. In
May of 1980, the Center for Disease Control published a report indicating a link between
TSS and menstruation, and later found a relationship between tampon use and TSS. It was
not until August of 1980 that Proctor & Gamble learned of a Minnesota study showing that
twice the percentage of Rely users had TSS than did those in a control group; CDC issued
similar findings on September 19, 1980. Id. at 617. Unlike cancer or GBS, the cause of TSS
is known, and thus, the epidemiological studies were offered not as inferential evidence of
cause per se, hut instead to establish a link between the product and the growth of the
causative agent.
" Plaintiff in Kehm died of TSS on September 6, 1980. 724 F.2d at 617. Proctor & Gam-
ble withdrew the product from the market on September 22, 1980. Id.
1984-851
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reports prepared by the Center for Disease Control and various state
health departments on the grounds of hearsay.'0 9 The district court had
admitted into evidence reports of epidemiological studies and had al-
lowed plaintiffs' expert to testify about the studies. Each of the reports
analyzed the statistical association of tampon use and TSS."' Proctor &
Gamble claimed that the statements were not "factual findings," that the
preparers did not have first-hand knowledge of the matters asserted, and
that the statements were not trustworthy, thus precluding their admis-
sion as an exception to the hearsay rule. The appellate court ruled that
merely because the findings were conclusory did not preclude them from
being factual; as long as the reports were prepared pursuant to an investi-
gation authorized by law, trustworthiness was the only real inquiry."'
In response, Proctor & Gamble asserted that the studies were not trust-
worthy because of the existence of particular biases inherent in compiling
the data. Moreover, the unavailability of the preparers for cross-examina-
tion made it impossible for Proctor & Gamble to discover and adjust for
the biases. This attack on the admissibility of the epidemiological studies,
however, was not successful."' The court instead ruled that the evidence
on both sides was sufficient to permit the jury to resolve the question of
fact.
This "balanced" approach, one in which the court permitted the use of
epidemiologic studies on the condition that the complaining party had
opportunity to proffer question and to offer contradictory studies, and
one in which the probativeness of the statistics offered is a question to be
oI Id. Proctor & Gamble also based its appeal on errors made by the district court in its
jury instructions, its refusal to grant a limiting instruction, its admission of evidence on
punitive damages, and, finally, because the court permitted an in-court demonstration. The
Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court. Id. at 628.
10 The district court based the introduction of the epidemiological evidence on FED. R.
Evin. 803 (8)(c), an exception to the hearsay rule, which permits admission of investigative
or "evaluative" public records and which specifically covers "factual findings." 724 F.2d at
618.
I' Id.
1' The court stated:
Allowing such cross examination as a condition of admissibility in cases like this
would not only threaten individual patient's privacy, it would also inhibit agen-
cies' efforts to collect data and inform the public in accordance with their statu-
tory mandate.
Moreover, though Proctor & Gamble could not cross-examine individual patients
and interviewers, it presented expert testimony of its own challenging the method-
ology of the government reports, and evidence rebutting the conclusion of those
reports. It thus has ample opportunity to attack the probative value of the ...
reports. The jury was therefore fully aware of the parties' conflicting assessments
of the reports, and we believe, fully capable of evaluating the evidence on both
sides.
Id. at 619. The court cited Migliorini v. United States, 521 F. Supp. 897 (D. Colo. 1981), as
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resolved by the jury, has also been found to be appropriate by courts con-
sidering a more difficult causation issue." 3 For example, two recent
courts considered and implicitly approved the use of epidemiologic stud-
ies as proof of causation of cancer. Subsequent appellate rulings, however,
have placed in doubt those decisions as bases for the judicial acceptance
of epidemiological proof. Both cases involved the causal relationship be-
tween prenatal exposure to diethylstilbestrol (DES) and clear-cell adeno-
carcinoma. In Mertan v. E.R. Squibb & Sons,"' plaintiff complained
that her mother had ingested doses of DES during her pregnancy; at age
19, plaintiff experienced symptoms of, and was subsequently diagnosed as
having a rare form of vaginal and cervical cancer. She sued several manu-
facturers of DES, and at trial offered epidemiologic studies by an expert
"3 Cases concerning cancer and the causation problems associated with it have not yet
flooded the courts. Instead it is instead in the workmen's compensation area that case law
on the subject maybe found. Cases in this area illustrate judicial acceptance of epidemiologi-
cal studies as the primary means for establishing causation. For example, statistics demon-
strating a causal connection between peritoneal mesothelioma and asbestos employment
have led to recovery. See, e.g., Osteen v. A. C. & S., Inc., No. 43692 (Nab. Workmen's Comp.
Ct. June 26, 1981) (Employed as insulator for forty years, a worker developed peritoneal
mesothelioma. Appellant employer claimed absence of competent medical evidence to estab-
lish that it was a compensable occupation disease. Under a statute permitting recovery for
all diseases except those occurring in "ordinary life," the workers' compensation panel held
that epidemiological evidence that peritoneal mesothelioma was negligible in the population
at large, but approached 7 % among asbestos workers, was sufficient and competent medical
evidence to establish causation.); Powell v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 273
S.E.2d 832 (W. Va. 1980) (recognized lung cancer as an occupational disease even though it
is an ordinary disease of life. The court cited medical journals and doctor's testimony as
support for causation; the court also stated that claimant need not negate all possible non-
occupational causes of an alleged disease. Prima facie case of causation is established once
exposure to hazard and suffering from it are thereby established, as long as studies and
research "clearly link" a disease to particular workplace.) Because the burden of proof in
workers' compensation cases is much less difficult to meet, application of these precedents
to common law torts is questionable. However, it does explain that this area is in the fore-
front in terms of accepting epidemiological studies as proof of causation.
One of the few cases in which causation was shown by epidemiologic proof in an area
other than workmen's compensation is Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d
292 (3d Cir. 1961). In Pritchard, plaintiff claimed that his lung cancer was caused by smok-
ing Chesterfield cigarettes for over thirty years. His cause of action was for negligence and
breach of warranty; defendant cigarette manufacturer had advertised that its cigarettes were
"pure" and that they would not cause harm to a smoker's nose, throat or other affected
areas. Id. at 296-97. Plaintiff supported his proof of causal relationship by the testimony of
five medical experts, one of whom was a specialist in the epidemiology of cancer. All testi-
fied that plaintiff's cancer was caused by smoking and that the chance of having lung cancer
was 4 to 11 times greater in smokers than in nonsmokers. The defendant responded that
such opinions had no validity, since no proof existed that his causal relationship had been
accepted by the medical profession. The district court ruled that this was a question for the
jury. On appeal, the decision was affirmed. Id. at 296. The case is of little significance today
in light of the Surgeon General's warning which appears on all packages of cigarettes and
which established plaintiffs' assumption of the risk.
... 141 Cal. App. 3d 511, 190 Cal. Rptr. 349 (Ct. App. 1983).
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witness to establish the causal connection between DES and this form of
cancer. Despite defendants' protestations, the court admitted statistical
evidence demonstrating that a relative risk of 675 to one existed for DES
ingestion and cancer."1 5 The jury was not persuaded, and the defendants
prevailed.
When reviewing the record below, the appellate court noted the expert
testimony introduced concerning the causal relationship between inges-
tion of DES by mothers and the incidence of clear-cell adenocarcinoma in
their daughters. The court did not, however, choose to rule on the error or
propriety of the introduction of the studies. The appellate court instead
reversed the decision below on other grounds.11
Similar studies were introduced and admitted with sound approval by
the federal district court in Needham v. White Laboratories, Inc."7
Plaintiff, as in Mertan, suffered from clear-cell adenocarcinoma; her
mother had also taken DES while pregnant. Plaintiff introduced medical
expert and statistical evidence that her mother's ingestion of DES caused
the cancer. The statistics offered as proof established an association be-
tween artificial estrogen (like DES) and genital tract diseases; another
"' See Dickson, Medical Causation by Statistics, 17 FORUM 792, 805 (1982). The author
Robert L. Dickson, represented one of the defendants in Mertan, and in this article de-
scribes the presentation of statistical proof at trial. He also offers criticism of the admission
of the epidemiological studies by the trial court judge. According to Dickson, plaintiff's epi-
demiologist based his conclusion of a connection between DES and cancer on studies of
forty women and thirteen cases of clear-cell adenocarcinoma conducted during the early
1970's. Id. at 805. Additional data, including a study undertaken to determine the number
of pregnant women who had taken DES, was reviewed and analyzed to corroborate the ratio
and an analysis was prepared comparing DES sales in a geographic area with the incidence
of clear-cell adenocarcinoma in that area. Id. at 806.
"IO The court found that the trial court's failure to authorize an amendment of the com-
plaint to reflect a recent California Supreme Court decision was prejudicial error. That deci-
sion, Sindell v. Abott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal Rptr. 132, cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980), provided that a plaintiff may recover even if unable to identify
the manufacturer of the DES ingested by her mother. Plaintiff in Mertan, at time of the
Sindell decision, had been unable to identify defendant responsible for the manufacture of
DES taken by her mother and had not amended the complaint to reflect the Sindell deci-
sion due to the possibility of exceeding a mandatory statute of limitations. 141 Cal. App. 3d
at -, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 351. The nearest the court on appeal in Mertan came to passing
on the admissibility of the epidemiological evidence was its commentary on admitting testi-
mony of another expert witness:
We need not reach the issue of whether allowing the testimony of Tobias Klinger,
as an expert witness without prior notice to plaintiff, was in violation of Code of
Civil Procedure section 2037. If error was committed, it was harmless. The testi-
mony which was presented to the jury, as distinguished from the testimony at the
Evidence Code section 402 hearing, consisted of a recitation of the procedures
followed in submitting a new drug application ...
Mertan, 141 Cal. App. 3d at _ , 190 Cal. Rptr. at 354. (emphasis added).
117 639 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1981). For a discussion of the lower court opinion, and other
issues of causation, see Phelan, Proof of Cancer From a Legal Viewpoint, in PLI HANDBOOK,
Toxic SUBSTANCES PROBLEMS IN LITIGATION 133 (1980).
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study indicated that the likelihood of the relationship between the inges-
tion of DES and the subsequent development of clear-cell adenocarci-
noma being "accidental" was only one in one hundred thousand.11
Plaintiff prevailed on the merits and was awarded $800,000.11" Defen-
dants moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict based primarily
on the grounds that the jury verdict was based on "speculation."' 12 0 The
court denied the motion and stated its sound approval for the use of sta-
tistical data for establishing causation, and affirmed the jury verdict.12 1
Notwithstanding the district court's approval of the use of epidemiolog-
ical proof, the decision was reversed, thus leaving in doubt the preceden-
tial value of that decision. On appeal, defendants claimed error in the
district court's introduction of evidence that the drug was ineffective for
its intended purpose. The appellate court agreed, ruling that the lower
court had erroneously interpreted section 402A of the RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS.' 22  Defendants also claimed error in the district court's
admission into evidence of a list of medical journal titles by plaintiffs
expert witness. The appellate court found that this was an abuse of dis-
"8 Phelan, supra note 116, at 148.
"9 639 F.2d at 397.
120 Id.
21 In response to the defendant's contention that the statistics were speculative, the
court stated:
Specifically, the jury was entitled to conclude on this record that maternal inges-
tion of synthetic estrogens during pregnancy is one such condition. It was also
entitled to conclude that reputable statistical analysis of confirmed data has led
qualified experts to believe that the coincidence of this potentially carcinogenic
condition with the actual fact of a case of clear cell adenocarcinoma makes "the
chances of a causal relationship extremely high." Finally, the jury was entitled to
conclude, by crediting Dr. Shimkin's testimony to this effect, that such statisti-
cally well established generalizations are equally reliable as, and functional
equivalents of, flat causal pronouncements. These propositions taken together
make the causal link between Anne Needham's condition and her mother's use of
dienestrol more than a mere possibility. Certainly the jury conclusions to this ef-
fect was far removed from the acts of imagination, speculation [and] mere conjec-
ture disapproved by Teffin. Accordingly, the court holds that there was sufficient
evidence to support the jury finding of causation.
Phelan, supra note 116, at 149.
1. 639 F.2d at 401. The district court admitted evidence on the effectiveness of DES on
the grounds that it was relevant to refute an affirmative defense under comment k of Sec-
tion 402A (risk of danger with product outweighs apparent usefulness). Alternatively, the
district court admitted the evidence on the grounds that it established that the product was
ineffective. Id. at 402. The court relied on a prior case which held that an ineffective prod-
uct is a defective product. Id. The district court had instructed the jury to return a verdict
for the plaintiff if it found that defendant knew or should have known that DES could cause
cancer in the children of users, or if the jury found that DES was ineffective. Id. The jury
did not return a special verdict, and accordingly, the appellate court was unable to deter-
mine the basis for its decision. Id. Consequently, it is not possible to determine whether the
appellate court would have agreed with the district court's ruling on the epidemiological
studies as being probative of causation.
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cretion, for plaintiffs had failed to lay an adequate foundation for admis-
sion of the list and also had failed to establish the accuracy of the
journals.123
VI. BENDECTIN
The lack of certainty of statistics is a burden facing plaintiffs in other
areas. Recently, plaintiffs have used epidemiological proof in cases con-
cerning the alleged association between Bendectin and birth defects, but
have not been successful due to the uncertain nature of the statistics. At
least one court has dealt with this uncertainty by imposing a ninety-five
percent confidence level before allowing use of epidemiological proof of a
connection between Bendectin and birth defects.12 In Oxendine v. Mer-
rell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 20 plaintiff alleged that her mother's ingestion
of Bendectin during her pregnancy with plaintiff caused her resulting
birth defect. Plaintiff buttressed her case against Merrell Dow with testi-
mony on causation from Dr. Alan K. Done.'26 In spite of Dr. Done's tes-
timony that an association existed between the birth defect at issue and
Bendectin, defendants were successful on a motion for ajudgment not-
withstanding the verdict.127 At trial, defendants led Dr. Done to admit
that statistics were never 100% correct and that proof of an objective
conclusion was not possible in medicine. The defendants argued that
plaintiff's expert testimony on Bendectin passed the bounds of a "reason-
able medical certainty" and entered the realm of speculation. The court
agreed.
VII. RADIATION EXPOSURE
An example of the use of undisputed epidemiologic proof can be found
in the recent landmark decision, Allen v. United States.'28 In that case,
'8 639 F.2d at 403. The articles were offered for the limited purpose of showing that
defendant should have known in 1952 that DES could cause cancer. Id. The plaintiff's wit-
ness, however, had not read all the articles nor could he testify that all of them were rele-
vant to demonstrate a relationship between DES and cancer. Id.
"24 Kollar v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., C.A. No. 80-1258 (D.D.C. 1983). A ninety-five per-
cent confidence level simply means that the odds of the result having occurred as the result
of chance are less than five in one hundred.
"'I Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., C.A. No. 1245-82 (D.C. Super. Ct.
1983).
"22 Plaintiff suffered from limb reduction at birth. Defendants' Memorandum of Points
and Authorities in Support of Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, or in the
Alternative, Motion for New Trail filed June 6, 1983 [hereinafter cited as Defendant's
Memo] in Oxendine v. Merrell Dow, supra, note 124.
Defendant's Memo, supra note 125, at 2.
228 Allen v. United States, No. C79-0515-J (D. Utah 1984). The Allen case consolidated 24
claims for alleged radiation induced cancers caused by fallout from atmospheric nuclear
weapons tests conducted at the Nevada Test site from 1951-1962. Id. at 3. The claims,
which were representative claims from the more than 1100 filed, were brought against the
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Judge Jenkins of the district court in Utah considered the issue of cancer
causation in the context of radiation exposure. Recognizing that the cause
of cancer is not known in fact, Judge Jenkins nevertheless permitted the
radiation exposure cases to proceed according to this remedial framework:
[T]his court now holds as follows:
Where a defendant who negligently creates a radiological haz-
ard which puts an identifiable population group at increased risk,
and a member of that group at risk develops a biological condi-
tion which is consistent with having been caused by the hazard to
which he has been negligently subjected, such consistency having
been demonstrated by substantial, appropriate, persuasive and
connecting factors, a fact finder may reasonably conclude that the
hazard caused the condition absent persuasive proof to the con-
trary offered by the defendant.1 19
Using this framework, the court cited the appropriate factual connecting
factors upon which a finding of causation could be based. These factors
included the presence of an observed statistical "incidence of the alleged
injury greater than the expected incidence in the same population."' 30
Indeed, the court also recognized that statistical evidence, under the pre-
sent facts, would be the "strongest evidence" available.' While recog-
nizing the inherent problems with statistics, including the appropriate-
government under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1976). Therefore
the basis for liability was negligence. Allen, No. C 79-0515-J, at 4. The court found negli-
gence in the government's failure to adequately warn residents in the affected areas of the
dangers of radiation and how they could protect themselves, and its failure to monitor radi-
ation dose levels, in localities near the test site, on a person-specific basis, or its equivalent.
Id. at 416-17.
1" Id. at 343-44 (citation omitted). Judge Jenkins likened the radiation cancer causation
issue to the common law tort cases wherein two hunters negligently fire and one pellet hits
an innocent bystander. Id. at 333-35. Notwithstanding the fact that only one hunter could in
fact be responsible, the burden was shifted to the defendants to establish the absence of
substantial factual connection to the injury on their part.
', Id. at 344. The other factors which Judge Jenkins considered included:
(1) the probability that plaintiff was exposed to ionizing radiation due to nuclear
fallout from atmospheric testing at the Nevada Test Site at a rate in excess of
natural background radiation; (2) that plaintiffs injury is of a type consistent with
those known to be caused by exposure to radiation; and (3) that plaintiff resided
in geographical proximity to the Nevada Test Site for some time between 1951
and 1962. Other factual connections may include but are not limited to such
things as time and extent of exposure to fallout, radiation sensitivity factors such
as age or special sensitivities of the afflicted organ or tissue, retroactive internal or
external dose estimation by current researchers, a latency period consistent with a
radiation etiology, or an observed statistical incidence of the alleged injury greater
than the expected incidence in the same population.
Id.
3I Id. at 346. The court stated that the study of the incidence of diseases is the "classic
approach" to researching radiation caused by cancer. Id. at 347.
1984-85]
29Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1984
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
ness of their use with small populations such as the one at issue, the court
nevertheless concluded that epidemiologic proof was credible evidence:
That data from small populations must be handled with care
does not mean that it cannot provide substantial evidence in aid
of our effort to describe and understand events. Mathematical or
statistical evidence, when properly combined with other varieties
of evidence in the same case can "supply a useful link in the pro-
cess of proof." If relied upon as a guide rather than as an an-
swer, the statistical evidence offered in this case provided mate-
rial assistance in evaluating the factual connection between
nuclear fallout and plaintiffs' injuries.132
The federal government did not dispute the epidemiologic proof
presented, 33 and the court ruled that ten of the twenty-four plaintiffs
prevailed. 3' In accordance with Judge Jenkin's prediction, the epidemi-
ologic proof was found to be the persuasive connecting factor of the
cases.
1 s
In a more recent decision involving allegations of radiation induced
acute myeloid leukemia, Roberts v. United States,3 ' Judge Foley, of the
District Court of Nevada, rejected the plaintiffs attempts to prove their
case by use of a study comprised of only eighty-six subjects. The judge
criticized the methodology and noted that other, larger studies had found
no effect.' 7
The decisions in which courts have considered epidemiological studies
as indirect evidence of causation provide little guidance for future use.
Some courts seemingly are comfortable only with those studies bearing
indices of credibility, such as the government-approved statistics offered
and unsuccessfully challenged or supplemented in the swine flu cases.'3 8
Id. at 352 (citation omitted).
The epidemiologic proof included the studies conducted of victims of radiation expo-
sure suffered during the attacks of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and federal government reports.
Id. at 375-407.
Allen, No. C79-0515-J at 407.
" Id. at 375-406. The majority of the unsuccessful plaintiffs failed because in the court's
words, their cases showed a "paucity of statistical evidence [needed to] demonstra[te] an
increased incidence of cancer of the bladder, the pancreas,. . melanoma and Hodgkins dis-
ease" attributable to radiation exposure. Id. at 382. A few plaintiffs failed either due to their
inability to rebut the government's supporting and finding arguments, or their failure to
plead sufficient facts of injury. Id.
13 Roberts v. United States, Nos. Civil LV 1766 and 76-259 RDF (D. Nev. 1984).
137 Id. at 95-97.
138 The "swine flu" decisions are somewhat anamolous and demonstrate an apparent
willingness on the part of some courts to embrace epidemiological studies as proof of causa-
tion. Notably, the defendant United States was the source of the epidemiologic studies
found persuasive in those cases. It is also of interest that courts considering swine flu vac-
cine claims did not venture past the bounds of the government's own study, evidencing a
judicial hesitancy to venture far into the epidemiological frontier.
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Appellate courts have managed to avoid the issue of the propriety of epi-
demiological studies as proof of causation by failing to address the ques-
tion,139 and district courts considering them either permit their admis-
sion as sufficient to raise questions for the jury (if the complaining party
has an opportunity to refute them) or, alternatively, criticize them for the
studies' inability to prove conclusively a cause and effect. 4"
This ambivalence perhaps may be attributed to the nature of epidemio-
logical studies. As case law demonstrates, statistics may be probative.
However, they can also be manipulated, thereby undermining the proba-
tive value and reliability of the conclusions drawn. 41 Moreover, the form
of the epidemiological proof offered presents evidentiary problems. The
studies themselves present problems of authentication and cross-exami-
nation; opponents of this type of proof claim that they are unable to
cross-examine the authors for any biases, assumptions, or the validity of
the studies.142  The problems of authenticity and cross-examination are
"'J See cases cited supra note 104.
140 Compare cases cited supra note 98 with those cited supra note 104.
'' Dickson notes the problems attributable to the size of the sample. Only forty women
were the subject of the clear-cell adenocarcinoma analysis, which the author contrasts to the
"thousands of cases studied in order to make the causal connection between smoking and
lung cancer." Dickson, supra note 114, at 805.
" See McGovern, Toxic Substances Litigation in the Fourth Circuit, 16 U. RicH. L.
REv. 247, 296-98 (1983). The author notes:
Experiments, studies, articles, documents and expert witnesses have created sub-
stantial difficulties for the trial judge .... Although some attorneys have been
successful in introducing epidemiological and other studies into evidence, they
must, however, overcome arguments suggesting that these studies are unreliable,
irrelevant, unnecessary, hearsay and not subject to cross-examination .... De-
fendants have argued that this type of testimony is inherently prejudicial because
the defense cannot cross-examine the witness upon the controls, assumptions, soft
variables, validity and other factors inherent in the studies that form the basis of
the expert opinion.
The author also suggests that the nonexamining expert should only be permitted to tes-
tify to the conclusions of his studies. "However, such an expert witness should not be al-
lowed to draw conclusions about the particular plaintiff because the witness had neither the
ability nor the opportunity to give the plaintiff a medical examination to establish specific
causation." Id. at 298.
Author Dickson, in his criticism of the superior court in Mertan, also notes the bias in
that case which may have altered the conclusions drawn from the study offered as proof of
causation. In that analysis, the control group was heavily represented by women without a
history of prior pregnancy losses, thus raising the question as to the reliability and applica-
bility of the results of the study to women with prior pregnancy-related problems. Dickson,
supra note 114, at 806.
As for the possibility that the compilers' assumptions may skew statistics, Dickson also
questioned the assumption in Mertan that one company's sales of DES remained constant
throughout the years of DES sales. Moreover, he soundly criticizes the studies used in the
trial court in Mertan for other deficiencies:
These examples of possible deficiencies in the analysis performed in [Mertan] il-
lustrate some of the major problems involved in an epidemiologist's reliance on
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exacerbated when one considers that the expert testifying to the results
of the epidemiological proof usually has no experience with the individual
plaintiff.
The most glaring problem with epidemiology as proof of causation,
however, is attributable to the nature of statistics; they do not account for
an individual's ailment. Neither do they refer to an individual's idiosyn-
cracies, sometimes called the "host factor.""" Because epidemiological
proof, by definition, does not "purport to isolate the sole cause for a sin-
gle individual's medical ailment,"""' it is limited in its application to indi-
vidual legal claims. Lacking capacity to be applied to individuals,
epidemiolgical studies are hardly a fail-safe substitute for direct proof of
causation."' However, to assist courts in their use of epidemiological
proof, legislation has been considered.
VIII. PROPOSED LEGISLATION
Since the mid 1970's, there have been numerous attempts to legislate
compensation for victims of disease resulting from toxic substances, ei-
ther as result of occupational exposure or of environmental exposures,
such as toxic waste dumps. In the first session of the 98th Congress alone,
retrospective studies. The studies reviewed are medical in nature and often give
little or no indication of the existence of necessary statistical controls or whether
they were constantly applied. As my discussion earlier of the smoking-lung cancer
association indicated such controls are considered to be critical and because of
their sensitivity and complexity often cannot be achieved through retrospective
studies. As a result the epidemiologist is forced, out of necessity, to make assump-
tions about how certain tests were performed, how certain controls were imposed,
and probably most importantly, what assumptions may have been made which do
not appear in the text of the studies relied upon.
Id. at 806-07.
"I See Henderson, Medical Causation in Product Liability Disease Litigation, 18 TRIAL
53 (July 1981) (other factors, such as genetic background, can affect plaintiff's propensity
for acquiring a disease). The realization that one's genes can affect the appropriateness of
applying general probabilities to an individual, is applicable to other personal habits, such
as smoking, life style, occupational history, or past illnesses. These characteristics inherently
make one person different from another, and accordingly, render general population statis-
tics more or less appropriate for determining the cause of an individual's ailment.
14 Szcezpaniak v. United States, No. 80-990 (D. Mass. 1983).
145 Author Michael Dore suggests that courts today use epidemiological studies too fre-
quently and often incorrectly. Because of the noted failings of epidemiological proof, Dore
suggests that this type of proof be used only under controlled circumstances, such as judicial
determinations of study reliability, so-called "quality control," and limiting jury instruc-
tions, which he deems to be "jury control." Dore, A Commentary On the Use Of Epidemio-
logical Evidence in Establishing Cause-In-Fact, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 429, 438-40 (1983).
Notwithstanding the obvious limitations of the use of epidemiological proof, some critics see
its benefits as far outweighing its drawbacks. Thus, Hall & Silbergeld, in their response to
Dore's article, conclude that epidemiological proof "can play a legitimate role as relevant
circumstantial evidence in showing causation." Hall & Silbergeld, Reappraising Epiderniol-
ogy: A Response to Dore, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 441, 448 (1983).
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nine such bills were introduced.146 A compensation program for those
injured by environmental chemical exposure was actually a part of the
bill which, as revised, became the "Superfund" Act. 147 Although that
program was dropped before the bill became law, the Act did provide for
the appointment of a study group to review remedies for damages due to
hazardous wastes.14 The study group was required to analyze any
problems with those remedies and to recommend change to the system so
as to obviate those problems. 49 Although at least one legislative propo-
sal has incorporated many of those recommendations,' 50 neither that pro-
posal nor any other victim compensation proposal has been passed by
Congress.
In the first session of the 97th congress, Senator Orrin Hatch and
others 1 ' proposed what appears to be the first effort by Congress to deal
specifically with the problem of compensation for cancer.' 5 The Hatch
Bill' 9 ' sought to amend the Federal Tort Claims Act 94 in order to render
' The Senate bills include: 1) S. 1155, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (to compensate those
with brown lung disease, resulting from cotton dust exposure); 2) S. 946, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1983) (to provide a complete compensation system for victims of environmental
chemical exposures); 3) S. 945, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (to provide for compensation for
medical expenses for victims of environmental chemical exposures); 4) S. 921, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1983) (to provide compensation for certain uranium miners and those exposed to
fallout from atomic weapons testing).
The House bills include: 1) H.R. 4303, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (to compensate victims
of environmental pollution pursuant to an amendment of the Toxic Substances Control
Act); 2) H.R. 3175, 98th Cong., 1st Sess (1983) (to compensate individuals with occupation-
ally related asbestos diseases); 3) H.R. 2582, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (to compensate
victims of environmental pollution); 4) H.R. 2482, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (to compen-
sate victims of environmental pollution).
147 S. 1480. 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1980). The enacted legislation, known as the
Superfund Act, is the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liabil-
ity Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-59 (Supp. V
1981)). See generally Nute, Compensation for Exposure to Hazardous Substances, 7 CHEM-
[CAL TIMES & TRENDS 27 (1984).
"' 42 U.S.C. § 9651(e) (Supp. V 1981).
Id. An example of the study group's required reports is Superfund Section 301(e)
Study Group 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. Injuries and Damages from Hazardous Wastes - Anal-
ysis and Involvement of Legal Remedies, (Comm. Print 1982) (available on microfiche:
Cong. Information Serv. 1982).
350 E.g., S. 946, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
S6' 5. 1483, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). Co-sponsors were Senators Kennedy, Garn, Can-
non, Laxalt, DeConcini, Randolph, Inouye, Hawkins, Metzenbaum, Pell, Hatfield, Mat-
sunaga, Moynihan, Denton, and Mathias.
"02 Congress had earlier enacted a comprehensive legislative scheme for the compensation
of coal worker's pneumoconiosis. See authority cited infra note 159. After the introduction
of this bill, Congressman George Miller and others introduced legislation to compensate
victims of asbestos related disease, one of which was asserted to be lung cancer. H.R. 3175,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
3 S. 1483, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
304 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1976).
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the United States liable for damages caused by particular types of cancer.
The eligible individuals had been exposed to radioactive fallout resulting
from nuclear tests at the Nevada test site and to radionuclides certain
uranium mines.
155
As originally proposed, the bill merely sought to introduce a rebuttable
presumption in any suit for damages against the government for radia-
tion-caused injury under the Federal Tort Claims Act.15 The rebuttable
presumption was that the damages alleged were caused by exposure to
radiation which resulted from a nuclear detonation or exposure to ura-
nium. The presumption would be invoked upon proof of two facts:' 5
(1) That the individual on whose behalf suit is brought lived or
worked within a defined "affected area" for a certain minimum
time period during the nuclear testing program (or worked in a
uranium mine for that period of time).' 58 (2) That the individual
on whose behalf suit is brought has one of the cancers defined in
the bill, or any other cancer identified by an Advisory Panel
established by the statute, as being related to radiation
exposure.'5
S. 1483, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1981). The necessity for the compensation remedy
provided by the bill was the result of nuclear weapons testing from 1951 to 1962 at the
Nevada test site. Id.
I ld. § 2(b).
The bill provided that the presumption arises "[i]f the court determines that the
plaintiff meets such requirements." Id. It is not certain from this language whether the
court is obliged to rule in plaintiff's favor as to the satisfaction of these requirements or
whether the factfinder may just hold the plaintiff has made a prima facie case before invok-
ing the presumption.
" Id. § 2(a)(1)-(3). Affected areas include those areas "shown to have received a signifi-
cant level of fallout as a result of the nuclear detonation[s] at the Nevada test site between
January 1, 1951, and October 31, 1958, or between June 30, 1962, and July 31, 1962." Id.
§ 2(e)(1)(A). That determination is to be made from the "best available fallout maps, as
determined by the Secretary [of Health and Human Services]." Id. Other affected areas as a
result of the same nuclear testing may also be identified by an Advisory Panel on the Health
Effect of Exposure to Radiation and Uranium which would have been created by this legis-
lation. Id. § 2(e)(1)(B). Plaintiffs seeking damages because they have developed cancer as a
result of living in an affected area between January of 1951 and October of 1958 must have
lived in the area for at least one year. Id. § 2(a)(1).
,' For those residing in the areas determined to have received a significant level of fall-
out, the listed disease are the acute leukemias, chronic myelogenous leukemia, thyroid carci-
noma, pulmonary carcinoma and osteogenic sarcoma. Id. § 2(a)(1). Also potentially compen-
sable are any cancers identified by the Advisory Panel on the Health Effects of Exposure to
Radiation and Uranium. These cancers are "those types of cancer ... that are more likely
than other cancers to develop in human beings after exposure to low level radiation." Id.
§ 4(b)(1)(A). For uranium miners, the listed diseases are lung cancer (the bill never ad-
dresses whether lung cancer and pulmonary carcinoma are the same) and "significant pneu-
moconiosis." Id. § 2(a)(3). In addition, the Advisory Panel may identify other compensible
diseases and illnesses "that are more likely than other diseases and illnesses to develop in
human beings who worked in uranium mines for at least a year between January 1, 1947,
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Once the presumption was invoked, the court was directed by the bill to
"admit and hear evidence" rebutting such a presumption.' e
Presumptions of compensability are fairly common devices in compen-
sation statues. Typically, the presumptions are contained in a number of
state laws which state that heart (and sometimes lung) disease in a police
officer or firefighter is work-related.' Presumptions are also in use in
two federal compensation schemes. The first is the Black Lung Benefits
Act"6 which, with its accompanying regulations provides a fairly compre-
hensive set of presumptions."' The second scheme, in the Longshore-
men's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,"' merely provides that it
will be presumed "in the absence of substantial evidence to the con-
trary. . .[t]hat the claim comes within the provisions of this [Act]." 5
The exact operation of a presumption of compensability has been much
debated, and its uses have been discussed in detail elsewhere.' 6 It is
sufficient to say that at least under the Longshoremen's Act, once sub-
stantial evidence is introduced by the defendant, the presumption drops
from the case, and the factfinder weighs the evidence to arrive at a
conclusion. 167
The presumption is a mechanism for shifting the burden of production
on an issue. The function of a presumption in the context of cancer cau-
sation is to shift the initial burden of coming forward with proof which
shows that it is more likely than not one's condition is due to the sub-
stance alleged to have caused it, and to place the burden on the defen-
dant to come forward with some level of proof that the condition was not
due to the substance alleged to have caused it.' Once this occurs, no
presumption exists for the case.
In October of 1982, during the course of the testimony on the Hatch
and December 31, 1961." Id. § 4(b)(1)(B). Since pneumonconiosis generally occurs only in
worker populations and epidemiology is usually not used to determine if it is work related,
pneumoconiosis will not be addressed further in this article.
160 Id. § 2(b).
161 E.g., V. CODE § 65.1-47.1 (Supp. 1983).
"6 Black Lung Reform Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-239, 92 Stat. 95 (1978), amended by
Black Lung Benefits Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-119, 95 Stat. 1643 (1981) (codi-
fied at 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945 (1976 Supp. V 1981)).
"' 30 U.S.C. § 921(c) (Supp. V 1981); 20 C.F.R. 727 200-06 (1983). The Black Lung Bene-
fits Amendment prospectively eliminated three of the presumptions contained in the prede-
cessor to § 921(c). See 30 U.S.C. § 921(c) (Supp. V 1980).
"' Pub. L. No. 92-576, 86 Stat. 1263 (1977), amended by Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-598, 92 Stat. 2679 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
II 33 U.S.C. § 920(a) (1976).
1l6 E.g., McElveen & Postol, Compensating Occupational Disease Victims Under the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 717 (1983).
67 See, e.g., Del Vecchio v. Bowers, 296 U.S. 280, 285-87 (1935) (presumption); United
States Steel Corp. v. Gray, 588 F.2d 1022, 1076-28 (5th Cir. 1979) (presumption in Black
Lung Benefits Act).
,"' See generally FED. R. EVID. 301 (effect of presumption in civil actions).
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bill, the use of a presumption in the radiation exposure context was criti-
cized. "' For example, Dr. Victor Bond of the Brookhaven National Lab-
oratories stated:
The bill provides that for any individual developing certain types
of cancer [and] who was in the region of fallout in certain time
periods, there would be a legal presumption that such cancers
were caused by fallout from government weapons testing, with no
reference to dose magnitude or other factors related to causation
. . . . However, the virtually "automatic" liability of the govern-
ment proposed in the bill is seriously defective with respect to the
scientific basis for the problem involved.170
Dr. Bond also pointed out that the risk of getting cancer from radiation is
related to a variety of factors including age, sex, personal characteristics,
latent and plateau periods for the tumor in question, radiation dose, and
origin of the radiation."' Dr. Bond indicated that two related ap-
proaches can and should be undertaken together in order to account for
the factors in any compensation scheme. The first approach is epidemiol-
ogy, which should be used to determine "the magnitude of the commu-
nity health problem," i.e. the number of additional cancer cases and
deaths that must be taken into account by community health officials.' 7'
The second approach is the method of estimating the odds that any given
cancer may be causally related to a specific exposure of an individual. 73
Based in part on testimony such as that of Dr. Bond, Senator Hatch
and others revised the proposed mechanism for compensation in the bill
by adopting an approach that incorporated Dr. Bond's suggestions. By so
doing, the bill attempted to utilize the science of epidemiology and the
concept of probability of causation.
The revised Hatch bill directed the Secretary of Health and Human
Services to determine and publish a list of radiation-related cancers.'
It also instructed the Secretary to devise and publish radio-epidemiologi-
cal tables that estimate the likelihood that persons who have (or had) any
of the radiation-related cancers and who have received specific radiation
doses before the development of any of those cancers, got the cancer as a
result of the radiation dose.'75 The Secretary was directed to establish
119 Hearing Before the Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, United States Senate on
S.1483, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
170 Id. at 247.
" Id. at 252 (testimony of Dr. Victor P. Bond).
172 Id. at 247.
171 Id. at 247-48.
"' S. 1483, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., §(4)(a) (Comm. Print) (1981).
175 Section 7(b) of the Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049, 2060 (1983)
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such probabilities of causation in percentages for doses from one millirad
to one thousand rads, taking into account age at time of exposure, sex,
time from exposure to the onset of the cancer, and other appropriate
factors. 76
The bill further provided that any individual subjected to radioactive
fallout from nuclear weapons testing who could establish that his or her
probability of causation exceeded fifty percent was entitled to an award
of actual damages from the United States of not more than $500,000."'
Any individual who established a probability of causation of from ten to
fifty percent was entitled to an award of damages of not less than $50,000
and not more than the product of his individual probability of causation
as multiplied by $500,000.s
This bill presented a complete departure from earlier compensation
legislation and the common law of torts in two ways: (1) It mandated that
the courts use radioepidemiological tables as the standard for judging the
merits of the case; and (2) It permitted damages to be awarded to indi-
viduals whose demonstrated probability of harm was less than fifty
percent.
The revised version of Senator Hatch's bill did not pass Congress in the
97th session and was reintroduced in the 98th. 79 One portion of the bill
did, however, become law as a rider to the Orphan Drug Act. 80 That
portion which was passed provided that, within one year of passage of the
Act, the Secretary of Health and Human Services was to develop and
publish radioepidemiological tables.' 81 Those tables are to be used to es-
timate the likelihood that persons who have developed any of the radia-
tion-related cancers and who had specific radiation doses prior to the on-
set of that disease developed the cancer as a result of these doses. 8
Though these probabilities will have no immediate legal effect, courts and
administrative bodies may refer to them for assistance in determining
whether given cancers may be related to radiation exposure. They may
also serve as a model for efforts to quantify the risks of other carcinogens.
If the probability tables are used, there is an obvious problem in regard
to dose measurement. Whereas radiation doses, in the occupational con-
text at least, have been rather carefully measured, doses of other sus-
pected cancer-causing agents, often inhaled or ingested decades ago, have
not been measured at all. Epidemiologic studies that have sought to mea-
sure the effect of doses have often divided the study population into
groups, depending on length of time spent at the job. If there is a dose-
17 S. 1483, supra note 171, at § 4(b).
117 S. 921, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., § 8(a)(1) (1983).
"78 Id.
S. 921, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
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response relationship and relatively constant exposure to the substance in
question, a person's risk continues to increase the longer they continue to
work.
IX. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
Despite the limitations of epidemiologic proof in particular and statisti-
cal analysis in general, courts should permit the use of epidemiologic
proof. The argument raised against its use-the imprecision of probabili-
ties-is weak considering that medical science is rarely, if ever, a precise
science. The popular assumption that medical diagnosis is based on medi-
cal certainties is undoubtedly a false one; many clinical medical diagnoses
are instead rooted in medical probabilities. This imprecision further ap-
plies to the medical diagnosis of the cause of the identified condition. As
a result, the excuse given for not using epidemiologic proof of causa-
tion-its reliance on probabilities-loses force in light of the inherent re-
liance on probabilities in every aspect of medical science.
The recommendation that courts accept epidemiologic proof is subject
to the qualifications discussed in this Article. Each study should be evalu-
ated for its reliability and validity prior to its introduction as sound evi-
dence. A high confidence level should be required, such as the 95 % level
of confidence mandated by the court in Kollar. 83 In sum, "quality con-
trols" such as those suggested by other critics, and indeed by the medical
profession, must be verified prior to judicial use.
Once accepting the recommendation to use epidemiological data, courts
are faced still with the choice of a rational procedural scheme by which to
consider the proffered evidence. Courts first ought to consider whether
the epidemiologic study at issue demonstrates a statistically significant
increase in the relevant disease. In particular, the absence of such a study
should sway the court when considering a summary judgment motion.
Such an absence should be particularly determinative when the burden of
proof is imposed by statute. Although the view that a failure to produce
credible epidemiologic proof should be determinative of case outcome
may seem harsh, at least one tribunal has approved of it and stated:
The employee meets his burden where medical science has
progressed to the point where, as here, epidemiological studies es-
tablish a higher than expected incidence of the disease among
workers exposed to the harmful stimulae. In cases where no such
relationship exists or where medical science has not yet discov-
ered the relationship, the employee may not be able to show that
working conditions could have caused the harm . . . . We are
aware that once the presumption is invoked, the subsequent allo-
cation of the burden of proof may in many instances be determi-
"I See note 123 and accompanying text.
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native of liability.1 8 4
In the above cited workers' compensation case, a statutory presumption
of compensability was invoked if the claimant was able to show harm and
a work-related factor that could have caused that harm. In that case, the
statement by means of an epidemiologic study was able to invoke the pre-
sumption. Thus, the failure to offer a sound epidemiological study in de-
fense was outcome-determinative. This scheme in areas other than work-
ers' compensation could, however, lead to failure of proof for plaintiffs as
well.
Conversely, the mere proffer of a study showing a statistically signifi-
cant increase in the incidence of disease should not lead automatically to
success on a summary judgement motion by its proponent. Certainly, the
existence of an epidemiological study which shows no excess incidence
should cause the case to be decided by the finder of the fact. Similarly, a
study which shows a relative risk of less than 2.0 should result in submis-
sion to the factfinder. Even if there are only studies which show an excess
incidence of more than 2.0, the decision as to the credibility and weight to
be given such proof should still remain with the finder of fact. As pointed
out, even in the situation of a statistically significant increased disease
incidence, the chance remains that the disease was not caused by the
agent. Sometimes, this chance is quite high. Furthermore, the category in
which the plaintiff falls is always a question for the trier of fact. Yet, if
there is no statistically significant increase, there is no evidence to pre-
sent to the trier of fact on the issue of causation. Such a failure on the
part of a party which has the burden of proof will undoubtedly result in a
summary judgment on that issue.
Junius C. McElveen, Jr. is a Partner in the Washington, D.C. office of Jones, Day,
Reavis & Pogue.
Pamela S. Eddy is an Associate in the Washington, D.C. office of Jones, Day,
Reavis & Pogue.
18, Compton v. Pennsylvania Avenue Gulf Serv. Center, 14 BEN. REV. BD. SERv. 472, 481
(1981).
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